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Abstract
This dissertation studies the problem of preparing good-quality social network data
for data analysis and mining. Modern online social networks such as Twitter, Face-
book, and LinkedIn have rapidly grown in popularity. The consequent availability
of a wealth of social network data provides an unprecedented opportunity for data
analysis and mining researchers to determine useful and actionable information in
a wide variety of fields such as social sciences, marketing, management, and secu-
rity. However, raw social network data are vast, noisy, distributed, and sensitive in
nature, which challenge data mining and analysis tasks in storage, efficiency, accu-
racy, etc. Many mining algorithms cannot operate or generate accurate results on the
vast and messy data. Thus social network data preparation deserves special atten-
tion as it processes raw data and transforms them into usable forms for data mining
and analysis tasks. Data preparation consists of four main steps, namely data col-
lection, data cleaning, data reduction, and data conversion, each of which deals with
different challenges of the raw data. In this dissertation, we consider three important
problems related to the data collection and data conversion steps in social network
data preparation.
The first problem is the sampling issue for social network data collection. Re-
stricted by processing power and resources, most research that analyzes user-generated
content from social networks relies on samples obtained via social network APIs.
But the lack of consideration for the quality and potential bias of the samples re-
duces the effectiveness and validity of the analysis results. To fill this gap, in the
first work of the dissertation, we perform an exploratory analysis of data samples
obtained from social network stream APIs to understand the representativeness of
the samples to the corresponding complete data and their potential for use in various
data mining tasks.
The second problem is the privacy protection issue at the data conversion step.
We discover a new type of attacks in which malicious adversaries utilize the con-
nection information of a victim (anonymous) user to some known public users in a
social network to re-identify the user and compromise identity privacy. We name
this type of attacks connection fingerprint (CFP) attacks. In the second work of the
dissertation, we investigate the potential risk of CFP attacks on social networks and
propose two efficient k-anonymity-based network conversion algorithms to protect
social networks against CFP attacks and preserve the utility of converted networks.
The third problem is the utility issue in privacy preserving data conversion. Ex-
isting k-anonymization algorithms convert networks to protect privacy via modify-
ing edges, and they preserve utility by minimizing the number of edges modified.
We find this simple utility model cannot reflect real utility changes of networks
with complex structure. Thus, existing k-anonymization algorithms designed based
on this simple utility model cannot guarantee generating social networks with high
utility. To solve this problem, in the third work of this dissertation, we propose
a new utility benchmark that directly measures the change on network community
structure caused by a network conversion algorithm. We also design a general k-
anonymization algorithm framework based on this new utility model. Our algorithm
can significantly improve the utility of generated networks compared with existing
algorithms.
Our work in this dissertation emphasizes the importance of data preparation for
social network analysis and mining tasks. Our study of the sampling issue in social
network collection provides guidelines for people to use or not to use sampled so-
cial network content data for their research. Our work on privacy preserving social
network conversion provides methods to better protect the identity privacy of social
network users and maintain the utility of social network data.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Social Network Data Analysis: A Brief Introduc-
tion
The proliferation of online social networks has been one of the most remarkable In-
ternet events in this decade. Because of the high penetration of Internet-enabled de-
vices such as personal computers, smart phones, and tablets, online social networks
have become easily accessible platforms for users to communicate and share infor-
mation. Many popular online social networks such as Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn,
and Google Plus have been growing rapidly. According to a market report in 2013,
nearly one in four people worldwide uses social networks. The number of social net-
work users around the world rises from 1.47 billion in 2012 to 1.73 billion in 2013,
an 18 percent increase. By 2017, the global social network audience will reach 2.55
billion [27]. Another study in April 2013 reveals that social networking has been
ranked as the most popular content category in worldwide engagement, accounting
for 27 percent of all time spent online [28].
Owing to the popularity of online social networking, the amount of social net-
work data available has been increasing rapidly. For example, every minute of a
day, 350,000 tweets are generated on Twitter 1, over 3000 pictures are uploaded to
1http://www.internetlivestats.com/twitter-statistics/
1
Flickr 2, and around 3.3 million items are shared on Facebook 3. These data provide
unprecedented opportunities for data analysis research. The primary objectives of
social network analysis are to handle large-scale social network data, extract action-
able patterns, and gain insightful knowledge about dynamic and multifaceted social
networks. Therefore, social network analysis is of significant value for many appli-
cation domains such as policy making, advertising, and homeland security. Social
network data available for analysis are usually voluminous, structurally complex,
heterogeneous, and dynamic in nature, and can be broadly classified as content and
linkage data [2]. Content data contain texts, images, and other multimedia data,
which are explicitly generated by social network users. Linkage data are essentially
graphs where individual users are represented by vertices, and relationships or in-
teractions between individuals are represented by edges. On each type of social
network data, a wide range of analysis tasks can be performed to reveal valuable
information.
 Content-based analysis studies heterogeneous and unstructured content gen-
erated by social network users such as blogs, images, videos, and tags. Some
popular analysis practices include opinion mining, trend detection, sentiment
analysis, collaborative recommendation, etc. This type of analysis has numer-
ous applications in business, politics, and consumer media research [79].
 Linkage-based analysis studies linkages among social network users. It is
used to reveal the structural properties and evolution patterns of social net-
works, determine important vertices and social influence, detect communi-
ties, predict unobserved or future links, etc. This type of analysis is critical
for various application fields such as social psychology, viral marketing, and
terrorism defense [13].
It has been observed that content generation and linkage formation are closely re-
lated in social networks. Therefore, combining linkage-based analysis with content-
2http://blog.flickr.net
3http://www.connectsafely.org/tag/social-media/
2
based analysis can improve the quality of analysis results or discover otherwise un-
observed information. For example, utilizing user profile information can greatly
improve the quality of clusters detected in social networks [109], and recommenda-
tion systems, if considering the underlying social network, can provide users with
more personalized content [48].
1.2 Data Preparation: Steps and Challenges
Social network data analysis is of significant importance for academia, industry,
government, etc. However, like any other analysis, it is limited by the availability,
quantity, and quality of data. Some analysis algorithms cannot run efficiently on
huge datasets. Analysis may generate misleading results if underlying datasets are
inadequate or biased. Carelessly prepared datasets may contain sensitive informa-
tion, which raises concerns for privacy and security and then causes analysis projects
to fail. Raw social network data are typically huge, mostly informal in nature (e.g.,
contain a lot of user-generated misspellings and abbreviations), and flooded with
sensitive personal information of individual users. Therefore, data preparation is
particularly crucial for the success of social network analysis.
The main objectives of data preparation are to process raw datasets, reduce time
and space costs, enhance data quality with better interpretability and accuracy, and
limit disclosure of sensitive information. The data preparation process can be de-
tailed into four main steps namely data collection, data cleaning, data reduction, and
data conversion [77]. In the following subsections, we discuss the challenges and
issues in each data preparation step, with a focus on the factors related to social
network data.
1.2.1 Data Collection
Researchers in the very early stage of social network research collected social net-
work data from individuals in particular social settings through questionnaires, in-
3
terviews, and surveys, which are very labor-intensive. The social network data col-
lected were usually limited on small communities of people, which limited the scope
of analysis. The development of online social media has brought a significant shift
in social network research, leading to the emergence of "computational social sci-
ence" [53]. It has greatly increased the availability and size of social network data,
and thus has broadened the variety of disciplines contributing to the advance of so-
cial network research. In this dissertation, our discussion is based on modern online
social network data.
Online social network data are collected from social network service providers
who possess the overall social network data of their service users. The collection
process is normally performed automatically through programs or scripts. Some
social media websites such as Facebook and Twitter provide APIs for data crawl-
ing. The main challenges of social network data collection are limited processing
power and storage space. Online social networks are usually huge as measured by
user population size, user-generated content volume, and update velocity. Take
Twitter, one of the most popular microblogging social networks, as an example.
The number of registered users on Twitter reached one billion in 2013, and collec-
tively, Twitter users now send over 500million posts every day [86]. These numbers
keep growing rapidly. Crawling such huge social networks requires robust systems
with high processing power and huge storage capacity (e.g., petabytes). Moreover,
social network websites usually set limits on the data access rate. For example,
Twitter allows up to 15 requests per 15 minutes sent to its REST API to access the
data (https://dev.twitter.com), and Foursquare sets a 500-limit on the number of re-
quests sent per hour (https://developer.foursquare.com). These rate limits further
prevent crawling algorithms from obtaining large amounts of social network data
efficiently. Because of the issues discussed above, collecting full social network
data is often infeasible. Some research utilizes various network sampling methods
to collect smaller sample networks of a large social network to perform analysis.
Some other research obtains samples of user-generated posts/updates via non-rate-
4
limited stream APIs. The success of the research highly depends on sample quality
(e.g., the representativeness of samples to the original full dataset).
1.2.2 Data Cleaning
Social network data contain a lot of informal user-generated content, which is in-
evitably accompanied by noise, spam, and inconsistency. The purpose of data clean-
ing is to remove noisy and irrelevant data from useful information. It improves data
quality and then improves the accuracy of analysis results. The typical issues that
data cleaning deals with are listed as follows:
 Noise and spam. Social networks depend heavily on user-generated content,
which spreads very fast across social networks. Therefore, social networks are
susceptible to various malicious spam and hacker actions. Noisy and harm-
ful information generated by malicious users and automated programs (e.g.,
web robots) not only leads to personal or business damage but also affects
the quality of data analysis results. Spam detection and removal in social net-
works have been addressed by existing work, e.g., [88, 92].
 Data inconsistency. User-generated social network data contain a lot of spelling
errors, abbreviations, and synonyms, which raise the issue of data inconsis-
tency. In addition, social network data collected from multiple data sources
with different data formats can also cause data inconsistency. Removing in-
consistencies in datasets helps to derive complete and integrated records. There
is some work dealing with matching entities in social networks [78, 75].
 Data incompleteness. Missing information in social network data is caused
by various reasons such as no access authorization, communication failure,
and imperfect data acquisition processes. Incomplete data can cause analysis
to fail or produce incorrect results. Various algorithms have been designed to
treat missing user profiles or links [69, 29].
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1.2.3 Data Reduction
Data collected from online social networks can be very large. It becomes very time
consuming for analysis algorithms to run on these data. The goals of data reduction
are to represent data in a reduced form (with or without information loss) which has
much smaller volume, and to make sure that analysis on the reduced data produces
the same or almost the same outputs as on the original data. The classic technologies
of social network data reduction include feature extraction and data compression.
 Feature extraction. Social network data are very rich in nature. For some
particular analysis requests, thousands of relevant features can be identified,
which are suspected to be notoriously redundant. Input data containing all
these features are very high-dimensional and large. Feature extraction tech-
nologies transform these data into a reduced set of features that contain rele-
vant information from the input data and can be used to perform the desired
tasks to replace the full-size input data. Feature extraction techniques are usu-
ally task and data specific. For example, Lee et al. [54] construct a bag-of-
words feature to represent documents for trending topic classification tasks.
Sengstock et al. [85] extract some latent geographic features from social me-
dia data for spatial information-related analysis. Generally, feature extraction
can reduce dataset size, enhance understanding of datasets, and improve per-
formance of analysis.
 Data compression. Large social network data can also be compressed by
transforming the data into a compact data structure with smaller size. Analysis
can be performed on the compressed data efficiently without decompression.
Various methods have been proposed to compress a large network allowing
efficient neighborhood queries, one of the most essential operations of graph
mining, over its compressed representation [19, 63].
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1.2.4 Data Conversion
With or without awareness, users are sharing a large amount of personal informa-
tion on social media such as their identities, daily activity patterns, and financial
and health statuses. Gathering and releasing social network data for analysis raise
genuine concerns about privacy disclosure. Therefore, social network data need to
be carefully converted to remove sensitive information (e.g., personal identifiers)
before being released for analysis. Preliminary data conversion methods based only
on removing sensitive information are not sufficient to prevent privacy breaches.
Malicious adversaries can link social network data with some external data or back-
ground knowledge to infer sensitive information. For example, Backstrom et al. [7]
demonstrate that the mere knowledge about a user's neighborhood structure can re-
veal the identity of the user. To prevent privacy disclosure, more sophisticated data
conversion approaches have been proposed [7, 10, 59, 99, 107, 110]. The main
challenge for these privacy protection approaches is maintaining a balance between
privacy and data utility.
1.3 Contributions
Social network data preparation is not a simple issue; rather it is a compositional is-
sue with various challenging problems. Each problem alone needs dedicated study.
In this dissertation, we focus on three crucial problems related to the data collection
and data conversion steps. One is the sampling issue in social network data col-
lection, and the other two are the privacy and utility issues respectively at the data
conversion step. Figure 1.1 provides a flow chart which summarizes the social net-
work data preparation steps and highlights the problems studied in this dissertation.
Our contributions are summarized as follows.
Firstly, we study the sampling quality issue in collecting user-generated content
from social networks. As mentioned in Section 1.1, social network data consist of
user-generated content data and linkage data. Various sampling methods on link-
7
Data Collection 
•Sampling method 
•Sampling rate 
•Sampling quality 
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•Noise and spam 
•Data inconsistency 
•Data incompleteness 
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Data Reduction 
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•Data compression 
• ... 
Data Conversion 
•Privacy protection  
•Utility preserving 
• ... 
Figure 1.1: Social network data preparation.
age data have been proposed, and their advantages and bias have been thoroughly
discussed [62]. However, relatively less attention has been paid to user-generated
content data on this issue. Restricted by processing power and storage space, most
research that analyzes user-generated content from social networks relies on sam-
ples obtained via streamAPIs. However, the lack of consideration on the quality and
potential bias of the samples reduces the effectiveness and validity of the analysis re-
sults. To fill this gap, in the first part of the dissertation, we perform a comparative
analysis of data samples obtained from social network stream APIs to understand
the representativeness of the samples to the corresponding complete data and their
potential for use in various data mining tasks.
Secondly, we study sophisticated data conversion techniques to protect user pri-
vacy in social networks. We address two main desiderata of a good privacy pro-
tection scheme namely privacy and utility. In the second part of the dissertation,
we discover a new type of attacks on social networks called connection fingerprint
(CFP) attacks, in which attackers utilize the connection information of an anony-
mous user to some known public users in a social network to re-identify the user
and compromise identity privacy. We formally analyze the risk of CFP attacks on
real-world social networks and propose two efficient k-anonymity-based network
conversion algorithms to protect social networks against CFP attacks and preserve
the utility of converted networks. One algorithm is based on adding dummy vertices.
It can resist powerful attackers with the connection information of a user with the
public users within n hops (n  1) and can preserve the centrality utility of public
users. The other algorithm is based on edge modifications. It is only able to resist
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attackers with the connection information of a user with the public users within 1
hop but preserve a rich spectrum of network utility.
Finally, in the third part of the dissertation, we identify the disadvantage of ex-
isting k-anonymity-based privacy protection methods for preserving social network
data utility. Most, if not all, of the existing k-anonymization algorithms convert
a network to protect privacy via deleting and adding edges, and at meanwhile they
control utility loss by minimizing the number of edges modified. We find that some-
times this simple utility model cannot reflect real utility changes of networks with
complex structure. Therefore, existing k-anonymization algorithms designed based
on this simple but not efficient utility model cannot guarantee generating social net-
works with high utility. To solve this problem, we propose a new utility benchmark
which directly measures the changes caused by a network conversion algorithm on
network community structure. We also design a general k-anonymization algorithm
framework based on this new utility model. Our algorithm can significantly improve
the utility of generated networks compared with existing algorithms.
1.4 Organization of the Dissertation
The work in this dissertation is an aggregation of several research papers we have
published or submitted. We organize them as follows. In Chapter 2, we review ex-
isting work on social network data sampling and privacy protection. In Chapter 3,
we analyze samples of user-generated content obtained via social network stream
APIs and highlight their potential for use in various data mining tasks. In Chapter
4, we investigate connection fingerprint attacks on social network data privacy and
propose corresponding protection algorithms. In Chapter 5, we consider the utility
issue when converting a social network to protect privacy and propose a novel util-
ity measure to enhance the utility performance of network conversion algorithms.
Finally, in Chapter 6, we conclude this dissertation and discuss promising directions
for future work.
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Chapter 2
Related Work
In this chapter, we further elaborate on the background of our study in this disser-
tation with a comprehensive literature review. We first discuss prior work on social
data sampling and identify the blank spot in this area of research to which our study
can contribute. We then review the current development of social network privacy
protection techniques and discuss the weaknesses of existing approaches which our
work can improve.
2.1 Social Network Data Sampling
With the development of Internet and online media, the size of online social net-
works is increasing exponentially. Collecting and handling huge social network
data challenge the social network analysis community. Social network data mainly
consist of linkage data and content data, which can be collected separately.
2.1.1 Sampling Linkage Data
Linkage data are essentially a graph representing social network entities (e.g., users)
and their relationships (e.g., friendships). In order to reduce the time cost and re-
source consumption of collecting a very large social graph, people usually collect a
much smaller sample of the complete graph and use the sample for analysis. Var-
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ious graph sampling techniques have been studied. The focus of these techniques
includes how to generate small enough samples of a huge graph efficiently, and
whether these imperfect samples can preserve certain graph properties or be used
to perform certain analysis tasks and produce similar results as if the tasks were
performed on the full graph.
There are three main types of graph sampling strategies, including vertex selec-
tion, edge selection, and sampling by exploration. Vertex selection strategies sample
a subset of vertices in a graph either randomly or with probability proportional to
some known properties of the vertices such as degree and PageRank values [55],
and then include associated edges. Edge selection strategies first select a subset of
edges by a certain principle, e.g., randomly, and then include associated vertices.
We can also combine vertex selection strategies with edge selection strategies to
perform sampling. For example, the random vertex-edge sampling method [50]
uniformly selects a vertex and then uniformly selects an edge associated with it, and
a hybrid sampling method [50] performs random edge sampling with probability p
and then performs random vertex-edge sampling with probability 1   p. Sampling
by exploration strategies start from including a set of seed vertices to the sample
and then choose next-hop vertices to add to the sample from the neighbors of the
current vertices in the sample. Various sampling algorithms are proposed based on
different methods of choosing next-hop vertices such as depth-first/breadth-first al-
gorithms [50], random walk-based algorithms [103], the forest fire algorithm [55],
the sample edge count algorithm [62], and the expansion sampling algorithm [61].
Some prior work compares the structural properties of samples obtained using
different methods with those of the original graph and discusses the sampling bias of
different methods. For example, Leskovec et al. [55] study sampling methods of the
three strategies and find some sampling by exploration methods (i.e., random walk
and forest fire) outperform vertex selection and edge selection methods in accurately
representing both the static and evolutionary patterns of the original graph, Gjoka
et al. [35] find the Metropolis-Hashing random walk algorithm and a re-weighted
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random walk sampling method can produce approximately uniform user samples
on Facebook, and Maiya et al. [62] investigate the bias of different sampling strate-
gies and show that certain types of bias are beneficial for many applications as they
"push" the sampling process towards inclusion of specific properties of interest (e.g.,
high-expansion or high-degree vertices).
2.1.2 Sampling User-Generated Content
The main stream of social network data sampling research focuses on sampling link-
age data. However, social networks contain not only linkage data but also a large
volume of user-generated content like blogs, status updates, and shared pictures and
videos. Similar to linkage data, user-generated content also contains lots of valu-
able information. Many social network analysis tasks are developed based on this
information such as opinion mining, event detection, and sentiment analysis. The
volume of user-generated content increases much faster than that of pure linkage
data because users in social networks continuously generate new content. An active
user can generate hundreds of new posts per day. Given the huge social network user
population, it is even more impractical to collect and maintain a complete record of
user activities. Therefore, most research and some commercial applications that an-
alyze user-generated content also rely on sampling. However, unlike linkage data,
relatively little attention has been paid to the quality of samples, even though it fun-
damentally affects the effectiveness and validity of the analysis results. To fill this
gap, in the first work of this dissertation, we perform an exploratory study of social
media content samples and emphasize how well the samples represent the under-
lying complete data. We will discuss more specific prior work on this subject in
Chapter 3.
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2.2 Social Network Privacy Protection
The importance of privacy protection has been well recognized in data mining and
data management research [3]. Prior work in this area studies privacy protection
on tabular data [57, 80], transactional data [33], and survey rating data [89]. A
comprehensive survey is provided in [31]. With the increasing popularity of social
network analysis research, the privacy problem on social network data starts to gain
a lot of attention [58].
2.2.1 Identity Privacy Protection
The identity disclosure problem is one of the mostly investigated social network pri-
vacy issues. Revealing the true identities of social network users can lead to further
disclosure of other sensitive information. Therefore, a social network is usually re-
leased for research and analysis with the personal identifiers (e.g., names, social se-
curity numbers) of all users removed. We call this released social network a naively
anonymized network. However, an adversary can use various background knowl-
edge about some victim users to re-identify vertices from the naively anonymized so-
cial network. The background knowledge that the adversary utilizes is usually some
structural features of the victims in the network. In other words, the adversary asso-
ciates an anonymized vertex in the network with a victim user if they have the same
structural features. This type of attacks is known as structural re-identification at-
tacks. Backstrom et al. [7] prove that many structural features which are maliciously
planted by attackers and naturally exist in social networks can be used to perform
re-identification attacks. The typical structural features used in re-identification at-
tacks include vertex degree, vertex neighborhood, subgraph, distances to hub ver-
tices, etc [38, 59, 107]. Other than structural features, some non-structural features
(e.g., community membership [97]) may also be used to re-identify vertices in social
networks.
To prevent structural re-identification attacks, various network conversion meth-
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ods have been proposed [10, 37, 38]. For example, the random permutation ap-
proach [37] protects privacy by randomly deleting and inserting m edges. This
method is simple, but it does not provide any quantitative guarantee on privacy.
Later, Bonchi et al. [13] propose to quantify the anonymity level of a randomly per-
turbed network based on entropy. The network generalization-based approach [38]
partitions the vertices of a social network into small blocks. Then, it converts the
social network into a super graph in which a super node represents a block of ver-
tices, and a super edge between two super nodes represents the connections between
vertices across the corresponding blocks. The super graph also contains statistical in-
formation in the super nodes and super edges (e.g., the number of vertices and edges
covered by a super node, and the number of edges represented by a super edge).
To guarantee privacy, this method requires partitions of size at least k. However,
the structural uncertainty introduced by the generalization significantly degrades the
utility of the social network.
The notion of k-anonymity [90] is widely adopted to prevent re-identification
attacks on social networks. The general idea is to convert a social network to a k-
anonymized network, in which every vertex is indistinguishable from at least k   1
other vertices. Thus, an attacker cannot associate a victim user with a vertex in the
network with probability larger than 1/k. Various k-anonymity schemes have been
proposed as well as the corresponding k-anonymization algorithms targeting on at-
tackers with different background knowledge. For example, Liu et al. [59] propose a
k-degree anonymity scheme against attackers with degree information of some tar-
get users. It requires that for every vertex v in the converted social network, there are
at least k  1 other vertices having the same degree as v. Zhou et al. [107] consider
attackers with neighborhood information and propose a k-neighborhood anonymity
scheme. It requires that for every vertex v, there are at least k 1 other vertices hav-
ing isomorphic neighborhoods. Zou et al. [110] propose a k-automorphism scheme
against attackers with unpredictable background knowledge. It modifies a network
such that for each vertex, there are at least k 1 other structurally equivalent vertices.
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Recently, Cheng et al. [18] propose a k-securitymodel to enhance the k-anonymity
notion with the ability to protect sensitive links. After applying this model to a so-
cial network, an attacker should not be able to associate any vertex to a user with
probability larger than 1/k, nor to determine two users linked by a path of certain
length with probability higher than 1/k. Zhou et al. [108] provide a comprehen-
sive survey of these k-anonymity schemes. The k-anonymization algorithms cor-
responding to those schemes all share the same high-level logic. They convert a
social network to satisfy their corresponding k-anonymity requirements by adding
or deleting edges/vertices and require the number of edges/vertices added or deleted
to be minimum in order to preserve the utility of the social network.
In this dissertation, we investigate the identity privacy protection problem in
the network conversion stage. We discover a new type of re-identification attacks,
namely connection fingerprint (CFP) attacks, on social networks where motivated
attackers utilize the connection information of a victim to some known public users
to re-identify the anonymous victim in a social network. This type of attacks is
novel because attackers utilize background knowledge which combines both non-
structural and structural features of the victim (i.e., the identities of some public
users and the connection patterns of the victim user to the public users) to perform
re-identification attacks. These attacks have not been studied by prior work. In
the second work of this dissertation, we formally define CFP attacks on social net-
works and propose corresponding k-anonymization algorithms to protect a social
network against CFP attacks. Because of the different assumption on attacks, the
k-anonymization algorithms that we proposed are very different from existing ones.
Besides privacy protection, in this dissertation, we also discuss the other impor-
tant component of a good privacy protection scheme: utility. Utility is important
because it directly affects the quality of released social networks, which is crucial
to the success of subsequent analysis tasks. Although the utility issue in releas-
ing tabular data has been well addressed [47, 57, 80], it has not been well studied
on social network data. The utility preserving approaches adopted by existing k-
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anonymization algorithms on social networks are fairly naive. Most, if not all, of
these algorithms try to minimize the number of edges/vertices changed to reduce
utility loss. We find this utility model is not effective because sometimes even a
small number of edges changed can cause great utility loss in a social network. In
the third work of this dissertation, we design a more effective utility measure based
on social community structure with a general k-anonymization algorithm framework
to generate anonymized social networks with high utility.
2.2.2 Link Privacy Protection
Although our work in this dissertation mainly focuses on the identity privacy prob-
lem, link privacy is also an important privacy issue concerned while a social network
is released for analysis. Protecting link privacy requires limiting the ability of attack-
ers to infer the presence or certain properties (e.g., weights) of some sensitive edges
in a social network. Random edge perturbation [37] is a commonly used technique
to prevent disclosure of edge existence. It appliesm random edge deletions followed
bym random edge insertions to a social network. Ying et al. [102] study the impact
of the edge perturbation technique on network eigenvalues and propose a new edge
randomization approach to preserve spectral characteristics of networks. Xiao et
al. [101] design a randomization scheme to obfuscate edge existence based on a hi-
erarchical graph model to preserve critical statistical properties of networks. Milani
Fard et al. [66] propose a neighborhood randomization approach which probabilis-
tically randomizes the endpoints of an edge within a local neighborhood to reduce
the distortion to network structure. Liu et al. [60] present edge weight perturbing
techniques to protect private link weight information in social networks. The tech-
niques designed for link privacy protection are not directly applicable to protecting
identity privacy.
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2.2.3 Differential Privacy
Unlike the work introduced above which releases a whole, possibly converted, net-
work for data mining and analysis, some other work considers releasing some statis-
tics of a network. To ensure privacy, random noise is added to the output statistics,
and the notion of differential privacy [26] is utilized to control the level of noise
injected to the output. An algorithm implementing differential privacy calculates
desired statistics of an input network and injects sufficient noise to the output so
that it is indistinguishable from the output on any "neighboring" network. A neigh-
boring network is the network that is different at a single edge or vertex (with its
adjacent edges) from the original network. In this way, attackers with arbitrarily
high levels of background knowledge cannot infer the presence of any edge or ver-
tex in the original network from the output, and correspondingly the algorithm is
considered to guarantee edge-differential privacy or vertex-differential privacy. The
success of implementing differential privacy relies on the precondition that the max-
imum possible change to the statistics resulted from the change of one edge or vertex
should be small and bounded. Such maximum possible change is called the sensi-
tivity of the statistics, which determines the minimum magnitude of noise that has
to be added to the output. The higher the sensitivity, the more the noise added to the
output.
A lot of differential privacy algorithms on social networks implement edge-
differential privacy. This is because under this definition, many network statistics
have low and bounded sensitivity, and thus the algorithms can generate relatively
accurate outputs with low levels of noise added. For example, Mir et al. [67] pro-
pose a method to generate differentially private Kronecker graph models of an in-
put network, based on which synthetic networks that mimic important properties of
the input network can be generated. Some work proposes edge differential privacy
algorithms to accurately estimate the degree distribution [36, 45], degree correla-
tion [83, 104], subgraph counting [44], and spectral properties [94, 5] of a social
network. Recently, Xiao et al. [100] propose a method to generate differentially pri-
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vate statistical hierarchical random graph models, which have theoretically proved
lower sensitivity and can preserve essential network properties such as degree dis-
tribution, shortest path length distribution, and influential vertices.
Vertex-differential privacy is a strictly stronger privacy guarantee. However, for
many network statistics, e.g., the number of edges and the frequency of a particular
subgraph, it may be infeasible to design algorithms that achieve vertex-differential
privacy while getting accurate results in the worst case. The problem is that vertex-
differential privacy algorithms must be robust to the insertion of a new vertex in a
network, but the statistics of the network can be altered dramatically by the inser-
tion of a vertex with many adjacent edges. In other words, the sensitivity of those
statistics under vertex-differential privacy is very high so that we need to add much
noise to the results, which makes the results useless. Some recent work considers
applying vertex-differential privacy to network data subject to certain constraints
which can bound the sensitivity of some network statistics under vertex-differential
privacy thus guarantee the accuracy of the results. For example, Kasiviswanathan et
al. [46] provide vertex-differential privacy algorithms on bounded-degree networks
for accurately releasing the edge number, subgraph counting, and degree distribu-
tion information of the networks. Chen et al. [17] design vertex-differential privacy
algorithms for subgraph-counting statistics with a relaxed definition of sensitivity
which measures only the maximum possible change of the statistics when a partic-
ipant is removed from the dataset. This sensitivity is always bounded and is often
small.
Even though differential privacy is often believed to provide a stronger privacy
guarantee and thus is preferred over some other syntactic privacy notions, e.g., k-
anonymity, it cannot completely replace syntactic privacy. As discussed in [23],
differential privacy has many genuine problems such as calculating sensitivity, util-
ity loss due to the inherent uncertainty, and the independence assumption of the data,
and it is more suitable for privacy preserving data mining scenarios, where the statis-
tics of the dataset to be analyzed are known prior to applying the privacy preserving
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process. While syntactic privacy is more suitable for privacy preserving data pub-
lishing scenarios, where no assumptions are made about the types of analysis that
can be executed on the dataset. In this dissertation, we focus on privacy preserving
release of social network data. Therefore, we apply the k-anonymity privacy notion
but not differential privacy.
2.2.4 Social Network Privacy in Other Scenarios
In this dissertation, our focus is on the social network privacy protection problem in
a scenario that data owners release a static social network to public for research and
analysis. However, we are aware there is much excellent work that discusses social
network privacy issues in different scenarios. For example, some work discusses
privacy protection in sequential release of dynamic networks [11, 25, 91], somework
discusses privacy issues in online social network settings [106, 42], and some work
considers protecting the privacy of outsourced networks in untrusted servers [32].
Although these problems are very interesting, they are orthogonal to the work in this
dissertation thus are not discussed in detail.
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Chapter 3
Sample Representativeness Analysis
for Social Network Data Collection
In this chapter, we study the sample representativeness problem of user-generated
content. Our study focuses on Twitter, a typical and fast-growing microblogging
service. We study Twitter because it is one of the mostly used data sources for social
media analysis research and applications. Twitter is a popular data source because of
its variegated uses including daily chatter, conversation, information sharing, news
reporting [43] and diverse topic coverage such as arts, family and life, business,
travel, sci-tech, health, education, style, world, and sports [105]. Many researchers
have analyzed Twitter content and made interesting observations with real business
value. For example, Sakaki et al. [82] utilize Twitter to detect earthquakes, Bakshy
et al. [8] study various methods of identifying influential Twitter users, which may
be useful for online marketing and targeted advertising, and Johan et al. [12] analyze
Twitter user sentiment to predict the stock market.
Despite the usefulness of Twitter data, the large number of Twitter users and
the even larger volume of tweets often make it impractical to collect and maintain
a complete record of activity. Therefore, most research and some commercial soft-
ware applications rely on samples, often relatively small samples, of Twitter data.
In most cases, the sample size is based on availability and practical considerations.
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Relatively little attention has been paid to how well the samples represent the un-
derlying stream of Twitter data. In this chapter, compare the samples obtained from
two of Twitter’s streaming APIs with a complete Twitter dataset to gain an in-depth
understanding of the nature of Twitter data samples and their potential for use in
various data mining tasks.
3.1 Motivation and Problem Description
Microblogging is an increasingly popular form of lightweight communication on the
Web. Twitter as a typical and quickly emerging microblogging service has attracted
much attention. Millions of Twitter users around the world form a massive online
information network by initiating one-way "following" relationships to others. Twit-
ter users post brief text updates, which are commonly known as tweets, with at most
140-characters. The tweets posted by a user are immediately available to his di-
rect followers and can be quickly disseminated through the network via retweeting.
Different from traditional blog platforms, where users write long articles with low
update frequency, Twitter generates a large volume of short and real-time messages
daily.
One obstacle to using Twitter data is their huge size, as measured by the size
of the user base, the volume of tweets, and the velocity of updates. The number of
registered user profiles on Twitter reached near a billion in 2013, and, collectively,
Twitter users now send over 500 million tweets every day [86]. These numbers
keep growing rapidly. It is challenging for third-party researchers and developers to
collect and manage such a huge amount of data.
Twitter provides API functions to facilitate third-party users to access the data
(https://dev.twitter.com/docs/). There are twomain types of Twitter APIs: the REST
API and the stream API. The REST API supports queries to Twitter user accounts
and tweets, and it usually has very strict limits on the query rate (e.g., 15 requests per
15 minutes). Although the REST API provides flexible access to Twitter data from
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almost every angle, the rate limits make it not suitable for collecting large amounts
of Twitter data and monitoring updates. On the other hand, the stream API provides
almost real-time access to Twitter's global stream of public tweets. Once the connec-
tion is built, tweet data are pushed to the client without any of the overheads incurred
by pulling data through the RESTAPI. The streamAPI produces near real-time sam-
ples of Twitter's public tweets. The convenience and immediacy of the stream API
make it a common source of Twitter data for a variety of applications and mining
tasks, for example, topic modeling [40, 76], disease outbreak surveillance [87], and
popular trend detection [64]. However, prior research has not addressed the issue
of how well the sample data provided by the stream API represent the original data
and, if do not, towards which properties the sample data might be biased.
In this work, we focus on characterizing the sample data from the Twitter stream
API, studying possible sampling bias, if any, and understanding the implications of
the findings to related applications. The Twitter stream API has different access
priorities. According to Twitter, the default Spritzer access provides a 1% sample of
the complete public tweets, whileGardenhose access provides a larger 10% sample.
However, Twitter does not reveal how the samples are generated and even does not
guarantee that the sampling ratios are stable. These make it difficult to perform
theoretical analysis of the sample data. Therefore, in this work, we conduct a study
to experimentally analyze the properties of Twitter data samples and compare them
with a baseline complete dataset.
Limited by storage capacity and the API access rate restrictions, we could not
afford to collect the complete set of tweets generated by all Twitter users (over 500
million tweets per day). Instead, we use the Twitter REST API to identify a rela-
tively small subset of Twitter users (i.e., the Singapore Twitter users) via a snowball
crawling process starting with a set of manually selected seed Singapore users. And
then, we obtain all the tweets generated by these Singapore Twitter users during
May of 2012 via crawling the Twitter REST API and use these tweets as the com-
plete dataset. Meanwhile, we gather the tweets of these users returned by the Twit-
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ter stream API in the same period with two different access priorities as the sample
datasets. We perform a comparative analysis of the sample datasets with the com-
plete dataset in terms of basic tweet statistics, content representativeness, user cov-
erage, and user interactions. We find that the actual sampling ratios of the Spritzer
sample and the Gardenhose sample are around 0:96% and 9:6% respectively. The
sampled Twitter data represent the general user activity patterns and tweet contents
of the complete dataset well even with a sampling ratio as small as 0:96%. How-
ever, the samples are biased towards active users and miss lots of user interaction
information. Extending the sampling period and increasing the sampling rate both
help to improve the coverage of the user base and the accuracy of the interaction
based user popularity estimation.
3.2 Related Work
The huge volume of user-generated content inmodern online social networks presents
challenges to researchers for collecting and analyzing these data. A common prac-
tice to deal with this problem is to generate and analyze a representative sample of
the complete data. There are several main issues in generating the sample: what is
a good sampling strategy, what is a good sampling ratio, and does the sample have
good quality? In the case of the Twitter stream API, the sample data are generated
by some unknown strategies designed by Twitter with approximately fixed sampling
ratios. Therefore, the focus of this work is on the unresolved question of whether
the sample data generated by the Twitter stream API are good enough for various
mining and analysis tasks.
A very recent work by Morstatter et al. [70] studies the same problem, however
there are important differences between their work and ours. The main difference
is that they use a sample dataset collected from the Twitter stream API that focuses
on a particular event: the Syria conflict from December 2011 to January 2012. We
analyze a dataset that is not event-specific to provide more general observations.
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In addition, their work does not address the issue of the sampling ratio, whereas
we study two different sampling ratios and discuss their effects on the quality of
the data obtained. In terms of methodology, they measure the daily sampling ratio,
whereas we also study the retweet ratio, and the user tweet frequency distribution
to provide a more comprehensive analysis. In studying tweet contents, they analyze
the correlation of the ranks of the top hashtags and compare the topic distribution of
the sample data with that of the complete data. We do not compare topic distribu-
tions because we consider topic alignment across unlabeled datasets to be difficult,
subjective, and unreliable. Instead, we study a rich set of terms in tweets includ-
ing text words, hashtags, urls, and url domains, and discuss the similarity of the
sample data using these terms to the complete data based on vocabulary coverage
and frequency correlations. In order to study user relationships, their work focuses
on the user retweet network, whereas we study not only retweet relationships but
also mention relationships. Finally, their work analyzes the geolocation distribution
of the tweets. However, since our dataset is based on Singapore Twitter users, the
tweets are mainly located in Singapore, the geolocation distribution adds no new
information. To sum up, our study on Twitter data samples is more general and
comprehensive than the study in [70].
The rising popularity of Twitter has inspired research into its characteristics.
Krishnamurthy et al. [49] perform a descriptive analysis of the Twitter user base
and compare the results of two datasets crawled by different techniques. The first
dataset is collected by snowball crawling of the Twitter network using the Twit-
ter REST API. It starts with a small set of seed users and expands the user set by
adding partial lists of the users being followed by the current users. The second
dataset is obtained by the Twitter public timeline API, which provides continuously
20 most recent tweet updates. The users associated with these tweets are extracted.
They find that the analysis results on the two datasets are similar in terms of the user
class, daily activity pattern, source interface usage, and geographic distribution. Our
work also analyzes Twitter datasets collected in different ways. However, it differs
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from the above work in three aspects. Firstly, the datasets analyzed have different
properties. Our work analyzes three datasets based on the same set of Twitter users:
i) a complete Singapore user tweet dataset collected by crawling the Twitter REST
API, and ii) two sample datasets obtained via the Twitter stream API with different
access priorities; the sample datasets are proper subsets of the complete dataset. In
contrast, Krishnamurthy et al. study two datasets that may cover different sets of
Twitter users. Secondly, the two studies have different purposes. In this work, our
focus is not on characterizing the Twitter user base, but on characterizing the Twit-
ter stream API and understanding how well the data collected from the stream API
represents the complete Twitter data space. Finally, because of the different study
objectives, we analyze different aspects of the datasets, not only including users, but
also tweets and user interactions.
Kwak et al. [52] conduct an exploratory analysis of the entire Twittersphere to
study the topological characteristics of the Twitter network and information diffu-
sion on it. Their results show a remarkable deviation from known characteristics
of human social networks. They find that the Twitter network has a non-power-law
degree distribution, short effective diameter, and low reciprocity, which establish
Twitter's role of a new medium of information sharing. This study collects the en-
tire Twitter network snapshot in its early stage (i.e., 2009). With the rapid growth
of the Twitter population, it becomes more and more difficult to handle the whole
Twitter network, not to mention tracking its frequent information update. There-
fore, much research has been performed on incomplete Twitter data. Java et al. [43]
analyze a Twitter subset with 76,000 users and 1 million tweets and categorize the
users based on their intentions on Twitter. Their dataset is collected by periodically
retrieving the most recent public tweets using an old version of the Twitter stream
API that is no longer supported by Twitter. Naaman et al. [72] study Twitter user
activity based on a small set of sampled non-organizational users and classify them
as "Meformers" and "Informers" according to whether they like to post tweets that
are self-related or general informational. Zhao et al. [105] characterize Twitter with
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topic modeling based on tweets collected from the Twitter stream API. They clas-
sify tweets into different topic categories and study the size distribution of these
categories. Huberman et al. [41] study the user activity and interactions in Twitter
and reveal that the use of Twitter is driven by a hidden network of connections under-
lying the "declared" friend and follower relationships. The dataset they use consists
of over 300,000 Twitter users and their tweets, however the method of collection
is not described. These studies use Twitter datasets collected in several different
ways, but none of them discusses the strengths and limitations of the data collection
methods used and the representativeness of their datasets.
Besides Twitter, several other popular social networks have been studied. [16]
and [34] study user-generated content on YouTube [16, 34]. Kumar et al. [51] ana-
lyze the structural properties of the Flickr and Yahoo!360 networks including path
lengths, changes over time, and component structure. Mislove et al. [68] verify
the power-law, small-world, and scale-free properties of many popular online so-
cial networks including Flickr, YouTube, LiveJournal, and Orkut. Benevenuto et
al. [9] characterize the behavior of a set of 37,000 collected users in online social
networks such as Orkut, MySpace, Hi5, and LinkedIn. None of these studies in-
vestigates the relationships between their analysis results and the data collection
methods. Ahn et al. [6] compare the topological characteristics and growth patterns
of three large-scale online social networks: Cyworld, MySpace, and Orkut. They
evaluate the validity of the snowball sampling method, which they use to crawl the
networks. Their results reveal that with a sampling ratio above a certain threshold,
snowball sampling captures the scaling property of the vertex degree distribution
correctly, but it cannot estimate other metrics such as the clustering coefficient dis-
tribution and degree correlation. Our work is different from this work because the
sample datasets that we study are not obtained by snowball sampling of the Twitter
network, but by an unknown sampling method developed by Twitter on the public
tweet stream.
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3.3 Data Collection
In order to study sampling bias, we need the complete Twitter dataset to serve as a
baseline, with which the sample datasets can be compared. However, collecting the
complete Twitter stream is not practical for our study because of its expensive cost.
Instead of considering the full set of more than 1 billion Twitter users, we focus on
the complete set of Singapore Twitter users, which is a smaller group. We used all
the tweets posted by the Singapore Twitter users within a one-month period as the
complete dataset. We also gathered all the tweets generated by these Singapore users
that appeared in the Spritzer and Gardenhose streams during the same timespan to
create two sample datasets.
The complete dataset was collected with the help of the social network mining
research group of Singapore Management University 1. In order to locate the Sin-
gapore Twitter users, a set of 58 popular Singapore Twitter users were manually
selected as seeds. Initially, the user set only contained these seed users. The user set
was then expanded by exploring the follower and friend lists of the users in the set.
A follower or friend of a current user was added to the user set if either he specified
his location to be "Singapore'' or he followed at least three of the known Singapore
users. In this way, a set of 151,041 Singapore Twitter users in 2012 was identified,
which covered the majority of the Singapore Twitter users. After the set of users
was constructed, the Twitter REST API was invoked to crawl the tweets generated
by these users for a one-month period beginning onMay 1, 2012 and ending onMay
31, 2012. The collected tweets formed the complete dataset referred to asComplete.
We collected two sample datasets at the same period via the Twitter stream API
using the Spritzer and Gardenhose access priorities respectively. The Spritzer and
Gardenhose streams output samples of the entire public tweet stream with differ-
ent sampling ratios. According to Twitter, Spritzer provides an approximately 1%
sample of the complete public tweets, while Gardenhose generates a larger sample
with a sampling ratio of around 10%. Twitter does not provide any description of
1https://sites.google.com/site/socnetmine/
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Table 3.1: Description of datasets.
Datasets Complete SampleSpritzer SampleGardenhose
API used for collection REST Stream (Spritzer) Stream (Gardenhose)
Timespan May 2012
Num. of users 151,041
Num. of Tweets 13,468,661 128,647 1,297,304
the algorithms that generate the samples nor does it guarantee the sampling ratios
to be stable. From the sampled tweets, we extracted the subsets that were posted
by the identified Singapore users. In this way, two samples of the complete dataset
were obtained, referred to as SampleSpritzer and SampleGardenhose respectively. Ta-
ble 3.1 provides some basic information of the datasets.
3.4 Analysis of Results
In this section, we perform a detailed comparative analysis of the collected sample
and complete datasets. Specifically, we compare them in terms of tweet statistics,
content representativeness, user coverage, and user interactions. Through the com-
parison, we try to understand the nature of the sample datasets, for which properties
the sample datasets are representative of the complete dataset, and for which prop-
erties the sample datasets are not representative. We also discuss the implications
of our findings for certain mining tasks.
3.4.1 Tweet Statistics
We first study the sampling ratio and basic tweet statistics in this section. We perform
analysis on the datasets collected over the one-month period and also present results
on a daily basis.
We begin the analysis by examining the actual sampling ratios of the two sample
datasets from the Twitter stream API and present the average daily sampling ratios
and standard deviations in Table 3.2. As shown in Table 3.2a, the Singapore users
generate around a half million tweets a day on average. The Spritzer and Garden-
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Table 3.2: Average daily sampling ratios.
(a) Daily sampling ratios for tweets.
Daily Complete SampleGardenhose SampleSpritzer
statistic tweet# tweet# sampling ratio tweet# sampling ratio
Daily avg. 481,024 46,332 9.62% 4,634 0.96%
Std. dev. 67,446 6,637 0.15% 664 0.014%
(b) Daily sampling ratios for users.
Daily Complete SampleGardenhose SampleSpritzer
statistic user# user# sampling ratio user# sampling ratio
Daily avg. 35,316 15,769 44.55% 3,625 10.22%
Std. dev. 2,407 1,601 1.88% 484 0.85%
Table 3.3: Daily tweets and retweets ratios.
Daily Complete SampleGardenhose SampleSpritzer
statistic tweet% retweet% tweet% retweet% tweet% retweet%
Daily avg. 84.41% 15.59% 84.24% 15.76% 84.21% 15.79%
Std. dev. 0.56% 0.56% 0.54% 0.54% 0.76% 0.76%
hose samples return around 0:96% and 9:6% of them respectively. The actual tweet
sampling ratios both are slightly lower than what Twitter announced (i.e., 1% and
10%). Table 3.2b shows the sampling ratios for users each day. We find on aver-
age there are around 35,000 Singapore users who generate tweets in each day, and
the Spritzer and Gardenhose samples capture around 10% and 45% of them respec-
tively. The sampling ratio for users is much higher than it is for tweets, which is not
surprising; each tweet appears just once in the complete dataset, whereas a user may
appear many times, thus increasing the likelihood that he will appear in a sample.
Next, we study whether the sample datasets preserve the general tweeting pat-
terns of the Twitter users. Table 3.3 lists the average proportions of original tweets
and retweets generated by the Twitter users each day. As observed from the table,
among all the tweets published daily, about 85% are original tweets, and 15% are
retweets. The same ratio between original tweets and retweets is captured by both
sample datasets. Figure 3.1 further illustrates the average hourly tweet counts of
the three datasets for all the 31 studied days. We observe that the Singapore users
tend to be more active at the nighttime. The tweeting frequency increases rapidly
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Figure 3.2: Average daily tweeting frequency distributions of Singapore Twitter
users.  is estimated power-law exponent. SE is the standard error of . R2 is the
square error of the power-law fitting.
after 17:00 and peaks at 22:00. Then it drops quickly through midnight and hits the
bottom at 4:00. Thereafter, as a new day starts, the users gradually regain activity,
and the tweeting frequency rises slowly through the day. The sample datasets both
reflect the same hourly tweeting frequency pattern of the users. The results above
indicate that both the small Spritzer sample and the larger Gardenhose sample ob-
tained via the Twitter stream API reflect the general user tweeting patterns of the
complete dataset accurately.
In addition, we analyze tweet patterns based on individual users. We plot the dis-
tribution of user average daily tweeting frequency in Figure 3.2. The average daily
tweeting frequency distribution of the Singapore users approximates a power-law
distribution with an exponent of -1.3365. However, the user average daily tweet-
ing frequency distributions captured by the Spritzer and Gardenhose samples fit the
power-law distributions with different exponents of -2.4544 and -1.8963 respec-
tively. Therefore, the sample data preserve the scaling pattern of the user tweeting
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Table 3.4: Symbols for a vocabulary.
Symbol Description
V The vocabulary for all the text words/hashtags/urls/url domains appearing
in the set of tweets of the studied timespan (e.g., one day or one month).
jV j The size of the vocabulary V ; it is the number of terms that exist in the
vocabulary.
t A term in a vocabulary representing a text word/hashtag/url/url domain.
t:fV , fV t:fV is the frequency of t in vocabulary V ; it is the number of times that t
appears in the tweet set on which the vocabulary is built. fV is the average
frequency of all the terms in V .
t:rV , rV t:rV is the rank of t in vocabulary V ; it is the rank of t in the vocabulary
based on its frequency. rV is the average value of all the term ranks in V .
frequency distribution (i.e., power-law), but tend to overestimate the proportion of
users with low tweeting frequency, and the overestimation is more serious in the
sample with a smaller sampling ratio, i.e., Spritzer.
3.4.2 Content Representativeness
Twitter data are also widely used for performing mining tasks such as event detec-
tion, sentiment analysis, content summarization, and topic modeling. As many of
these tasks are built upon analyzing tweet contents, it is important to understand if
the tweet contents in the sample datasets from the Twitter stream API accurately
represent those in the complete dataset.
For each dataset, we extracted the vocabularies of four common types of text rep-
resentation: text terms, hashtags, urls, and url domains. We performed lightweight
preprocessing of the text terms by eliminating stopwords 2, punctuation, and non-
English terms. For each dataset and each method of representation (e.g., Spritzer
urls), we record the frequency of each vocabulary item and its rank each day and
for the entire one-month timespan, as described in Table 3.4. We analyze the corre-
spondence of the vocabularies of the complete dataset and the sample datasets using
four metrics as described in Table 3.5 and display the results in Table 3.6.
Wemeasure howwell a vocabulary of a sample dataset covers the corresponding
2We use a stopword dictionary with 429 distinct terms
(http://www.lextek.com/manuals/onix/stopwords1.html).
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Table 3.5: Comparison metrics for vocabularies.
Metric Description
Ssize The size ratio of a vocabulary of the sample tweet set (VS) and the corre-
sponding vocabulary of the complete tweet set (VC). Ssize = jVS jjVC j
Sctf The collection term frequency (ctf) ratio of a vocabulary of the sample tweet
set (VS) and the corresponding vocabulary of the complete tweet set (VC).
Sctf =
P
t2VS t:f
VCP
t2VC t:f
VC
Spcc The Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient of the term fre-
quency values of a vocabulary of the sample tweet set (VS) and the
corresponding vocabulary of the complete tweet set (VC). Spcc =P
t2VS\VC (t:f
VS fVS )(t:fVC fVC )qP
t2VS\VC (t:f
VS fVS )2
qP
t2VS\VC (t:f
VC fVC )2
Sscc The Spearman's rank correlation coefficient of the term rank val-
ues of a vocabulary of the sample tweet set (VS) and the cor-
responding vocabulary of the complete tweet set (VC). Sscc =P
t2VS\VC (t:r
VS rVS )(t:rVC rVC )qP
t2VS\VC (t:r
VS rVS )2
qP
t2VS\VC (t:r
VC rVC )2
vocabulary of the complete dataset using two metrics: the size ratio and the collec-
tion term frequency (ctf) ratio. Each metric provides a different perspective on how
well the sample vocabulary covers the complete vocabulary.
The size ratio metric calculates the proportion of the unique terms in a vocabu-
lary of the complete dataset that are captured by a sample dataset. As observed from
Table 3.6a, the Spritzer sample only covers around 6% of the text vocabulary, 2:5%
of the hashtag vocabulary, 1% of the url vocabulary, and 3:7% of the url domain
vocabulary in each day. The size ratios of the vocabularies of the Gardenhose sam-
ple are much higher due to the higher sampling ratio (i.e., the Gardenhose sample
covers around 26% of the text vocabulary, 16% of the hashtag vocabulary, 9% of the
url vocabulary, and 18% of the url domain vocabulary in each day). In addition, we
find that the size ratio of the url vocabulary almost equals the tweet sampling ratio,
while the size ratios of text terms, hashtags, and url domains are much higher than
the tweet sampling ratio. This result is easily explained. Many of the url terms occur
only once in the complete dataset, thus the odds of seeing them in a sample depend
strongly on the sample size. In contrast, many individual text terms, hashtags, and
url domains have higher occurrence frequency, thus samples tend to cover more of
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Table 3.6: Content representativeness based on four types of vocabularies daily and
for all the studied days (i.e., one month).
(a) Size ratio (Ssize)
Daily SampleGardenhose SampleSpritzer
statistic text hashtag url url domain text hashtag url url domain
Daily avg. 0.257 0.160 0.090 0.182 0.064 0.025 0.010 0.037
Std. dev. 0.021 0.019 0.013 0.023 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.003
All days 0.237 0.185 0.092 0.184 0.062 0.032 0.010 0.034
(b) ctf ratio (Sctf )
Daily SampleGardenhose SampleSpritzer
statistic text hashtag url url domain text hashtag url url domain
Daily avg. 0.915 0.622 0.121 0.915 0.750 0.371 0.034 0.837
Std. dev. 0.013 0.044 0.018 0.013 0.022 0.038 0.006 0.020
All days 0.977 0.791 0.144 0.960 0.939 0.603 0.054 0.926
(c) Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient (Spcc)
Daily SampleGardenhose SampleSpritzer
statistic text hashtag url url domain text hashtag url url domain
Daily avg. 0.997 0.9715 0.911 0.987 0.975 0.856 0.655 0.974
Std. dev. 0.002 0.021 0.045 0.005 0.005 0.040 0.195 0.013
All days 0.100 0.993 0.990 0.988 0.999 0.979 0.973 0.985
(d) Spearman's rank correlation coefficient (Sscc)
Daily SampleGardenhose SampleSpritzer
statistic text hashtag url url domain text hashtag url url domain
Daily avg. 0.812 0.641 0.433 0.736 0.705 0.552 0.268 0.754
Std. dev. 0.009 0.016 0.022 0.018 0.013 0.044 0.050 0.036
All days 0.817 0.691 0.442 0.706 0.811 0.623 0.266 0.692
these vocabularies.
The results on the size ratio metric indicate that the sample datasets cover only
small proportions of the vocabularies for different types of representation of the
complete dataset. However, the size ratio metric treats every term equally; it is
skewed by the many terms that appear just a few times in the dataset. Based on our
observation, the infrequent terms are more likely to be typographical errors and/or
user-created words, which may be less important for studying Twitter contents.
In order to distinguish the frequent terms from the infrequent ones, we adopt an-
other vocabulary coverage metric namely collection term frequency (ctf) ratio [14].
This metric also calculates the proportion of the terms in the complete vocabu-
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lary that are covered by a sample vocabulary. But, it weights each term with its
frequency of occurrence to give more credits to the frequent terms. The frequent
and moderately-frequent terms convey the most information about the contents of a
dataset [15]. Therefore, the ctf ratio is a more appropriate metric for measuring the
quality of a sampled vocabulary. The closer the ctf ratio is to 1, the more a sample
contains the terms that are frequent in the complete dataset 3. The results of the
ctf ratio are displayed in Table 3.6b. Generally, we find that the ctf ratio for every
vocabulary is much higher than the corresponding size ratio, and the Gardenhose
sample has higher ctf ratios than the Spritzer sample because of the higher sampling
ratio.
Closer inspection reveals that different types of text representation behave dif-
ferently.
 For the daily text term vocabularies, the ctf ratios are significantly high (e.g.,
they are around 0.75 for the Spritzer sample, and they exceed 0.9 for the Gar-
denhose sample). Therefore, even the small sample datasets contain the text
terms that account for most of the word occurrences in the complete dataset.
 The ctf ratios for the Spritzer sample are about 0:37 for the daily hashtag vo-
cabularies, whereas the Gardenhose ctf ratios are about 0:62. Sampling over
a one-month timespan improves the Spritzer coverage to 0:60 and the Gar-
denhose coverage to 0:80. These results suggest that one might want to be
cautious about drawing conclusions from daily variations in hashtag occur-
rences in the Spritzer stream, and even conclusions based on the Gardenhose
stream (10 larger) will miss significant amounts of hashtag activity. Obser-
vations based on a one-month timespan are more reliable, but will necessarily
miss some hashtag activity.
 The ctf ratios for urls are very low for both sample datasets, due primarily to
the fact that many of the urls only occur once in the dataset. One may interpret
3Note that stopwords are not included in this comparison. If stopwords were included, they would
dominate the weighting, and all methods would have ctf ratios close to 1.
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this result as indicating that many tweeted urls are unimportant and thus safely
ignored; or, it may mean that tweeting frequency is a less reliable method of
determining the importance of a tweeted url. In any of the cases, the Spritzer
and Gardenhose streams provide only very limited information about the urls
in the underlying complete stream.
 Instead of using individual urls, some researchers may be interested in only the
domains that produce urls, for example, to identify information sources that
are popular with Twitter users. We find that the Spritzer sample has very high
ctf ratios (i.e., around 0.83) for url domains, and the ctf ratios are even higher
for the Gardenhose sample (i.e., about 0.92). Therefore, even though the sam-
ple datasets do not provide enough information for studying the popularity of
individual urls, they preserve the important url domains very well.
In addition to analyzing the daily vocabularies, we also analyze the cumulative
vocabularies of the one-month period. We find that extending the sampling period
does not improve raw vocabulary coverage as the size ratios are not significantly im-
proved with the cumulative vocabularies. This observation is consistent with Heaps'
Law, which predicts the continued growth of a vocabulary as more texts are ob-
served [39]. However, the long sampling period helps to improve the coverage of
the frequent terms, as indicated by the increase in the ctf ratios for the cumulative
vocabularies.
The size ratio and ctf ratio metrics only evaluate the proportions of (frequent)
terms that are captured by the sample datasets. They do not evaluate whether the fre-
quency information of the captured terms is well preserved by the sample datasets.
In other words, they do not evaluate whether the term frequency information ob-
tained from the sample datasets is correlated with the actual term frequency in the
complete dataset. For mining tasks such as event detection, tweet content summa-
rization, and sentiment analysis, term frequency information is crucial. Therefore,
in the following analysis, we use another two metrics to study the quality of the
term frequency information in the sample datasets: the Pearson product-moment
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correlation coefficient (PCC) and Spearman's rank correlation coefficient (SCC).
The Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient (PCC) measures the linear
dependency of the term frequency values in a sample vocabulary and those in the
complete vocabulary. Its value is in the range of [ 1; 1]. The value is close to 1 if the
term frequency values in the sample dataset and the complete dataset are strongly
correlated, the value is 0 when the term frequency values are uncorrelated, and the
value is  1 when the term frequency values are inversely correlated. Spearman's
rank correlation coefficient (SCC) measures the linear dependency of the frequency-
based term rankings of a sample vocabulary and the complete vocabulary. To cal-
culate the SCC score, the terms in a vocabulary are ranked in descending order of
their frequency in the dataset. Rank ties are handled by assigning a rank that is equal
to the average of their positions in the ranked list. For example, if the top two terms
both have the highest frequency in the ranked list, i.e., there is a tie between position
1 and position 2, the ranks assigned to these two terms are both 1:5 = 1+2
2
. The SCC
score is calculated based on the term rankings with a function similar to that of the
PCC metric (see Table 3.5), and it has the same value range.
The results of these two metrics are shown in Table 3.6c and Table 3.6d. We
find that in most of the cases, the PCC values are above 0.8 and 0.9 for the Spritzer
and Gardenhose vocabularies respectively. Thus, the term frequency values of the
sample datasets are linearly correlated with those of the complete dataset. In other
words, the sample datasets accurately estimate the relative frequency of the terms in
every vocabulary. The results of the SCC metric are not as good as those of the PCC
metric, but still are reasonably high, except for the url vocabularies. Therefore, the
sample datasets predict the term rankings of text terms, hashtags, and url domains
to a certain extent. The degradation of the SCC performance is mainly caused by
the ties in the term ranking. The url vocabularies have the most rank ties since many
of the urls only appear once in the datasets, thus have the worst SCC performance.
The improvement of the PCC and SCC scores by extending the sampling period is
not very obvious.
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Table 3.7: Features derived for sentiment classification.
Feature category Features
Overall scores (6)
Sum of positive and negative scores for Adjec-
tives.
Sum of positive and negative scores for Adverbs.
Sum of positive and negative scores for Verbs.
Score ratios to number of terms (6) Ratios of positive and negative scores to totalnumber of terms
for each part of speech.
Positive to negative score ratios (3) Positive to negative scores ratio for each part of
speech.
Negation (1) Percentage of negated terms in a tweet
Sentiment Analysis
To demonstrate the usefulness of the sample data for analyzing Twitter content, we
perform a sentiment classification task on the sample datasets and the complete
dataset and then compare the results. Sentiment classification is an opinion min-
ing activity concerned with determining what is the overall sentiment orientation of
the opinions contained within a given document (e.g., tweet). The sentiment orien-
tation can be classified as positive or negative. We implement the binary classifier
described by Ohana and Tierney to analyze the sentiment orientation of tweets [74].
We extract sentiment features of tweets using SentiWordNet and then train an SVM
classifier to assign sentiment labels to the tweets in each dataset. SentiWordNet is a
lexical database for opinion mining. Given a term and its part-of-speech tag, Senti-
WordNet returns three sentiment scores ranging from 0 to 1: positivity, negativity,
and objectivity, each indicating the term's sentiment bias. The sum of the three
scores equals 1. In the experiment, we use the GATE Twitter part-of-speech tag-
ger (https://gate.ac.uk/wiki/twitter-postagger.html) to perform part-of-speech anal-
ysis on tweets then calculate SentiWordNet scores for terms found. We derive a total
of 16 sentiment features based on the scores as described in Table 3.7.
We traine a linear SVM classifier with a set of 1224 manually classified tweets
from a separate dataset. The training data consist of 570 positive tweets and 654
negative tweets. We apply the trained classifier to predict the sentiment orientation
of the tweets in our datasets.
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Figure 3.3: Percentage difference of positive (or negative) tweets daily. X-axis is
binned difference. Y-axis is the count of days in each bin.  is average difference
of 30 days,  is standard deviation.
Firstly, we analyze Twitter's daily overall sentiment polarity by counting the per-
centages of tweets with positive sentiment and negative sentiment respectively in
each day. In order to compare the sample datasets with the complete dataset, we cal-
culate the absolute difference of the positive tweet percentages of a sample dataset
and the complete dataset in each day 4. Figure 3.3 presents the percentage differ-
ence distributions of the Spritzer and Gardenhose samples over the studied 31 days.
We observe that for all the 31 days, the percentage differences of both datasets are
fairly small (i.e., less than 1:8%), which indicates that both sample datasets can re-
flect Twitter's daily sentiment orientation very accurately. It is not surprising that
the larger Gardenhose sample shows higher accuracy of predicting Twitter's daily
sentiment polarity. Its daily percentage differences are all smaller than 0:6%.
Besides the overall sentiment orientation, we also study Twitter's sentiment ori-
entation towards hashtags. We group the hashtags that are captured by both sample
datasets based on their popularity in the complete dataset. We categorize the hash-
tags which were used by more than 1000 tweets as very popular, the hashtags which
were used by less than 1000 but more than 500 tweets as moderately popular, and
the hashtags which were used by less than 500 tweets as less popular. We ignore
the hashtags that were used by less than 100 tweets because of their lack of popu-
larity. We infer Twitter's sentiment orientation to a hashtag also by the percentages
4The absolute difference of the negative tweet percentages is the same as that of the positive tweet
percentages.
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(a) Very popular hashtags
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(b) Moderately popular hashtags
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(c) Less popular hashtags
Figure 3.4: Percentage difference of positive (or negative) tweets in different hashtag
groups with different popularity levels. X-axis is binned difference. Y-axis is the
percentage of hashtags in each popularity group.  is the average difference of all
the hashtags in each popularity group,  is standard deviation
of the positive and negative tweets containing this hashtag. We use the percentage
difference to evaluate the error of a sample dataset for predicting Twitter's sentiment
polarity to each hashtag. Figure 3.4 shows the percentage difference distributions
of the three hashtag groups. We find that the Gardenhose sample relatively accu-
rately reflects Twitter's sentiment orientation to the hashtags in the very popular and
moderately popular groups. In these two groups, the Gardenhose sample captures
sentiment orientation for most of the hashtags (i.e., more than 90% and 80% of the
hashtags respectively) with the percentage difference less than 8%. The performance
of the Gardenhose sample degrades greatly for the less popular hashtags. It can only
guarantee small percentage differences (e.g., less than 8%) for around 50% of the
hashtags. Not surprisingly, the performance of the smaller Spritzer sample is not as
good as that of the Gardenhose sample. It can only achieve less than 10%percentage
differences for around 70% of the very popular hashtags. For most of those not so
popular hashtags, the percentage difference is not small.
To sum up, in this subsection, we find that both the Spritzer and Gardenhose
samples can be used to estimate Twitter's overall sentiment orientation. However,
for individual hashtags, the Gardenhose sample can be used to estimate Twitter's
sentiment orientation for very popular and moderately popular hashtags, while the
Spritzer sample may be only suitable for estimating Twitter's sentiment for very
popular hashtags.
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Table 3.8: Average number of tweets daily of captured and missed users.
Daily SampleGardenhose SampleSpritzer
statistics captured users missed users captured users missed users
Daily avg. 23.99 4.20 48.45 10.13
Std. dev. 2.56 0.08 2.49 0.55
3.4.3 User Coverage
According to the analysis in Section 3.4.1, the daily user sampling ratios of the
Spritzer dataset and the Gardenhose dataset are about 10% and 45% respectively.
Thus, more than half of the users in the complete dataset who tweet each day are not
captured by the sample datasets. In the following analysis, we compare the prop-
erties of the users captured by the sample datasets with those of the users that are
missed. Here, the missed users refer to the users who generate tweets and are in-
cluded in the complete dataset, but their tweeting behavior is not captured by the
sample datasets.
Firstly, we calculate the average numbers of the tweets generated daily by the
captured andmissed users respectively and report the results in Table 3.8. The results
show that the captured users tend to publish more tweets than the missed users. To
be more specific, the users captured by the Spritzer sample publish more than 48
tweets daily on average, while themissed users generate only around 10 tweets daily.
The average daily tweeting frequency of the captured users and the missed users in
the Gardenhose sample is around 24 and 4 respectively. These results imply that
samples generated by the Twitter stream API are biased towards active users who
tweet frequently every day, and they may lose the voice of less active users. The
bias is more significant with sample datasets having smaller sampling ratios (e.g.,
SampleSpritzer).
Although the user samples are biased towards active users, we expect that this
bias can be remedied by extending the sampling period. In other words, with the
extension of the sampling period, the chance of discovering inactive users will in-
crease. To verify how fast the user samples grow as the sampling period increases,
we first identified the 37,124 Singapore users who published tweets on the first day
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Figure 3.6: Average daily tweeting frequency distribution of missed users.
of the complete dataset as the baseline user set. Then, we monitored the Twitter
stream API to see when these users were observed. Once a user's tweets were spot-
ted, we added that user to the sample user set. We performed this monitoring using
both the Spritzer stream and the Gardenhose stream for 60 days and maintained two
sample user sets respectively. Figure 3.5 plots the size changes of these sample user
sets over the 60 days.
The sample user set from the Gardenhose stream grew quickly for the initial 10
days, eventually reaching about 87%of the baseline user set. After that, it converged
slowly to the baseline user set. After 60 days of monitoring, 35,174 Singapore users
were discovered, which covered about 95% of the baseline user set. However, the
set of users found in the Spritzer stream converged much more slowly because of the
low sampling ratio. After 60 days, it only had captured 23,036 users, which covered
62% of the baseline user set. We conclude that extending the sampling period helps
to improve user coverage, and a period of 10 days is enough for discovering most
of the baseline users (i.e., more than 85% of them) using the Gardenhose stream.
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After 60 days of monitoring, there were still some users that had not been seen
in the Spritzer and Gardenhose samples. We examined the daily tweeting frequency
distributions of these missed users. The results are displayed in Figure 3.6. More
than 90% of the missed users in both datasets tweeted infrequently, i.e., generated
no more than 10 tweets a day. Therefore, it is not surprising that these users did not
appear in any sample.
The daily tweeting frequency distribution of the users not found in the Garden-
hose sample is significantly skewed towards the extremely low frequency users (i.e.,
users who tweet less than once a day on average) compared with the Spritzer sample.
This result confirms that the higher sampling rate increases the chance of discover-
ing low-activity users, and only extremely inactive users are missed.
However, there is a group of users who are very active (i.e., post more than 100
tweets daily), but do not appear in any sample. Although this group is small -- less
than 1% of the missed users -- it is perhaps surprising that these users do not appear
in either of our samples. We manually checked the profiles and the tweets of these
users. Most of these users are organizational users or marketers who periodically
tweet urls linking to external websites or product promotions. We suspect that these
users' tweets are intentionally excluded from the sample streams, perhaps because
Twitter has identified them as robots, spammers, or other undesirable information
producers. This group of missing users may not be a problem for most research,
because it is a tiny group, and because the information that they provide may not
represent "real'' user content. However, they might be important for research that
studies robot and spammer behavior.
3.4.4 User Interactions
Another type of valuable information embedded in Twitter data is the interactions
between users. There are two main types of interactions between Twitter users:
mention interactions and retweet interactions. A Twitter user mentions another user
by inserting "@username" into the body of his tweet. Mentions are usually used to
42
Table 3.9: Proportions of the reciprocal and directed user mention interactions ex-
tracted from the complete and sample datasets daily and for all the studied days (i.e.,
one month).
Daily Complete SampleGardenhose SampleSpritzer
statistics reciprocal directed reciprocal directed reciprocal directed
Daily avg. 11:44% 88:56% 7:18% 92:82% 4.10% 95.90%
Std. dev. 0:34% 0:34% 0:51% 0:51% 0.47% 0.47%
All days 10:67% 89:33% 9:25% 90:75% 5.73% 94.27%
signify quotes from other users' posts or to send direct messages to the users that are
mentioned. A Twitter user retweets another user's tweet by clicking the "Retweet"
button under that tweet. A retweet is a re-posting of someone else's tweet.
Mention and retweet interactions can be directed or reciprocal. Usually, a di-
rected interaction indicates an "informational relationship'' between users because
the information only flows one-way from a user to another, while a reciprocal inter-
action indicates a "friendship relationship'' because there is communication between
users. In the rest of this Chapter, we use the terms "interaction'' and "relationship''
interchangeably.
Mention and retweet relationships can be obtained from tweet meta-data. They
are commonly used for many tasks such as understanding user roles in Twitter, iden-
tifying influencers, and modeling information diffusion. In this section, we extract
the mention and retweet relationships among the Singapore Twitter users from the
complete and sample datasets respectively and study the representativeness of the
sample datasets on these relationships. We first analyze the mention relationships.
The same analysis is performed on the retweet relationships as well.
We first examine whether the sample datasets represent the proportions of the
reciprocal and directed mention relationships in the complete dataset. Table 3.9 pro-
vides the results. Among all the Singapore Twitter users, about 11:4% of the men-
tion relationships captured daily in the complete dataset are reciprocal, and 88:5%
of them are directed. However, in the Spritzer sample, 4% of the mention relation-
ships captured are reciprocal, and 96%of them are directed; while in the Gardenhose
sample, the proportions of the reciprocal and directed relationships are around 7%
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Table 3.10: Recall of user mention interactions daily and for all the studied days
(i.e., one month).
(a) Recall on all users
Daily SampleGardenhose SampleSpritzer
statistic RecallDir: RecallRec: RecallAll RecallDir: RecallRec: RecallAll
Daily avg. 0.181 0.109 0.173 0.021 0.007 0.020
Std. dev. 0.013 0.021 0.014 0.001 0.001 0.001
All days 0.244 0.208 0.240 0.040 0.020 0.038
(b) Recall on captured users
Daily SampleGardenhose SampleSpritzer
statistic RecallDir: RecallRec: RecallAll RecallDir: RecallRec: RecallAll
Daily avg. 0.213 0.143 0.206 0.064 0.053 0.063
Std. dev. 0.014 0.026 0.016 0.004 0.008 0.004
All days 0.283 0.263 0.281 0.095 0.086 0.095
and 93% respectively. These observations tell us that the sample datasets tend to un-
derestimate the amount of reciprocal relationships, and the underestimation of the
Spritzer sample is more serious than that of the Gardenhose sample. Again, we find
that extending the sampling period improves the estimation of the proportions of re-
ciprocal and directed relationships. The Gardenhose sample for a one-month period
has similar proportions of these relationships to those of the complete dataset.
Next, we study how many of the relationships in the complete dataset are cap-
tured by the sample datasets. We calculate the recall of reciprocal, directed, and
all relationships and list the results in Table 3.10a. As observed from the table, the
Spritzer dataset and the Gardenhose dataset recover around 2% and 17% of all the
daily interactions among all the Singapore Twitter users respectively. Given the
tweet sampling ratios of the two datasets (i.e., less than 1% and 10%), these recall
values are reasonable. However, many applications that utilize user interaction in-
formation need a complete view of user relationships, for example, analyzing user
network properties and studying network-based information diffusion. For these
applications, the sample datasets do not provide sufficient information.
Even though the recall of mention relationships is increased by extending the
sampling period to one month, it is still far from complete, i.e., in the best case,
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Table 3.11: Estimation of user popularity based on frequency of being mentioned
using the data daily and for all the studied days (i.e., one month).
Daily SampleGardenhose SampleSpritzer
statistic Sctf SPCC SSCC Sctf SPCC SSCC
Daily avg. 0.544 0.938 0.547 0.168 0.808 0.321
Std. dev. 0.048 0.025 0.021 0.014 0.040 0.018
All days 0.906 0.994 0.825 0.576 0.973 0.553
the Gardenhose sample captures only 24% of all the interactions of the Singapore
Twitter users based on the one-month period of sampling. To get a nearly complete
view of user relationships, much longer sampling timemay be needed. However, the
relationships among Twitter users are relatively dynamic. Relationship information
extracted from historical data may lose effectiveness. We also notice that the recall
of reciprocal relationships is generally smaller than that of directed relationships,
which indicates that reciprocal relationships are harder to capture from sample data.
The analysis described in Section 3.4.3 found that a sample dataset only covers
a proportion of the active users every day. To make our analysis fairer, we also
calculate the recall of the interactions between these captured users; the results are
displayed in Table 3.10b. As observed, if we only focus on the captured users, the
recall values of all the daily interactions of the Spritzer dataset and the Gardenhose
dataset increase to around 6% and 20% respectively. By extending the sampling pe-
riod to one month, the two datasets capture around 9:5% and 28% of all the mention
interactions between the captured users respectively. Since much of the interaction
information between users is missing from the sample data, researchers cannot con-
struct a user mention network from the sample data that has similar properties to the
user network constructed from the complete dataset.
In the final set of analysis, we study the intensity of users being mentioned. This
piece of information is important for studying user roles and locating influencers in
Twitter. Usually, popular users that are mentioned many times by many users are
more important than less frequently mentioned users in the Twitter space. To per-
form the analysis, we extracted the frequency of users being mentioned in the com-
plete and the sample datasets respectively and produced rankings of users based on
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Figure 3.7: Distribution of the frequency of users being mentioned based on the
tweets of the one month period.  is estimated power-law exponent. SE is the
standard error of . R2 is the square error of the power-law fitting.
the frequency. Then the ctf ratio, PCC score, and SCC score were calculated based
on the extracted information to evaluate the effectiveness of the sample datasets for
preserving user popularity information. The results are presented in Table 3.11.
One day of the 1% Spritzer sample contains tweets that mention the users who
are responsible for about 16% of the mentions in a day of the complete dataset (Ta-
ble 3.11). One day of the 10% Gardenhose sample contains tweets that mention the
users who are responsible for about 55% of the mentions in the complete dataset.
The PCC scores based on the daily samples are very high, i.e., 0.8 and 0.93 for
the Spritzer and Gardenhose samples respectively, which indicates that the mention
frequency of users in the sample datasets is strongly correlated with the mention
frequency in the complete dataset. If a user is mentioned in the sample data, the
frequency information is relatively reliable. However, many of the users mentioned
frequently in the complete dataset are not observed in a one-day sample.
Extending the sampling period to onemonth greatly improves the results. The ctf
ratios are greatly improved, especially for theGardenhose sample (i.e., over 0.9). We
also find that the PCC score and the SCC score based on the extended sampling pe-
riod increase to 0.99 and 0.82 respectively for the Gardenhose sample. Therefore, by
extending the sampling period, the Gardenhose sample successfully captures most
of the popular users and accurately predicts the users' relative popularity in terms of
the frequency of being mentioned. Even though the ctf ratio of the Spritzer sample is
also improved to 0.57 by extending the sampling period, it is still at risk of missing
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many important users. Therefore, it is preferable to use the Gardenhose sample with
an extended sampling period for studying user popularity.
We also analyze the user popularity distribution based on the frequency of being
mentioned using the data of the one-month period. The results are displayed in Fig-
ure 3.7. We find that the user popularity distribution in the complete dataset approx-
imates a power-law distribution with an exponent of -1.5977. The user popularity
distributions of the sample datasets preserve the power-law property but with smaller
exponents, thus they overestimate the proportion of less popular users. Again, we
find that the user popularity distribution of the Gardenhose sample is more similar
to the original distribution compared with the Spritzer sample.
We performed exactly the same analysis on retweet interactions. Despite varia-
tions in numbers and details, the results are similar to the results based on mention
interactions. All the observations made with mention interactions in this section are
applicable to retweet interactions.
3.5 Summary
In this chapter, we provide a descriptive study of Twitter data samples obtained from
the Twitter stream API with two different access priorities (i.e., Spritzer and Gar-
denhose). These two data streams are data sources for a variety of research and
commercial applications. By comparing the sample data with the corresponding
complete data in different aspects, we explore the nature of the sample data, their
bias, and how well they represent the complete data stream. Our results provide
insights about the sample data obtained from the Twitter stream API and provide
incentives for people to use or not to use them for their research.
We find that the Twitter streams with the Spritzer and Gardenhose access priori-
ties provide samples of the entire public tweets with actual sampling ratios of around
0:96% and 9:6% respectively. The sample datasets truthfully reflect the daily and
hourly activity patterns of the Twitter users in the complete dataset. Moreover, the
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sample datasets capture the approximate power-law property of the user tweeting
frequency distribution in the complete dataset, but with smaller exponents. In other
words, the sample datasets preserve the same scaling property of the user tweeting
frequency distribution as the complete dataset, but tend to overestimate the propor-
tion of low-frequency users. The overestimation is more serious when the sampling
ratio is small. These observations indicate that the sample datasets, even with a very
small sampling ratio such as the Spritzer samples (i.e., 0:96%), are good for study-
ing Twitter user activity patterns in general. However, researchers should be careful
about the overestimation of low-frequency users when trying to analyze users based
on their activity levels and, if possible, use the larger sample (i.e., Gardenhose) to
reduce the estimation error.
Even with a very small sampling ratio (i.e., 0:96%), the sample datasets are able
to capture certain important tweet contents, e.g., text terms and url domains, and
preserve the relative importance (i.e., the frequency of appearance) of the content
terms. Our work demonstrates that the sample datasets are useful for many tasks
that analyze tweet contents, such as event detection, sentiment analysis, and tweet
summarization. For some other types of contents, e.g., hashtags, the small Spritzer
sample is not adequate to preserve accurate information, and the larger Gardenhose
sample is needed. However, for some content entities like urls, of which the ap-
pearances in tweets are temporal (e.g., each url only appears once or a few times),
the importance of the terms is not reinforced by recurrence. In this case, the sample
datasets may only capture small portions of the data, and may miss lots of crucial
information.
The sample datasets are biased towards active users, as one might expect. We
find that extending the sampling period or increasing the sampling rate both help to
improve user coverage. By carefully examining the users that are difficult to sample,
we find that the majority of them are extremely inactive with very low average daily
tweeting frequency (e.g., post less than 1 tweet a day). A small proportion of the
users that are not sampled are highly active, but probably spammers that Twitter
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Table 3.12: Summary of conclusions.
Tasks Usefulness
of sample
data
(Yes/No)
Comments
General tweet statistics Yes Spritzer samples are enough.
Event detection Yes If hashtags are used, Gardenhose samples
are preferable.Sentiment analysis YesTweet summarization Yes
User network analysis No
Information diffusion No
User popularity Yes Gardenhose samples with a long sampling
period are preferable.
deliberately excludes. For the tasks of studying the general Twitter user base, these
two types of users are the least interesting because the extremely low-activity users
hardly contribute anything to Twitter, and the spammers most likely only generate
noise information. Therefore, the Twitter stream API can be used for collecting
representative Twitter users.
Finally, we find that owing to the low sampling ratios on tweets, the sample
datasets cover only small proportions of the user interactions, i.e., mentions and
retweets, embedded in tweets. For example, in the best case, the Gardenhose sam-
ple captures around 28% of the mention relationships between the captured users
in the one-month sample of data. Therefore, the sample datasets cannot provide a
complete view of the user interaction network, thus are unsuitable for the tasks that
study user network properties and information diffusion. However, for the tasks that
study users' popularity based on their frequency of being mentioned or retweeted,
Gardenhose samples for a one-month period provide relatively accurate information.
In general, the Twitter data samples obtained via the Twitter stream API pre-
serve enough information for the research or applications conducted based on gen-
eral tweet or content statistics, such as user activity pattern characterization, event
detection, sentiment analysis, and tweet summarization. They may also be useful
for analyzing the Twitter user base and user popularity. However, they cannot pro-
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vide a complete view of the user interaction network for tasks such as user network
analysis and information diffusion modeling. Table 3.12 summarizes our findings.
Although our results provide new information about the quality of Twitter data
streams, they are limited by the scope of the datasets, which were collected based
on a set of Singapore Twitter users. Even though our work focuses on general pat-
terns and metrics that are not population specific, analysis of a different user pop-
ulation might lead to different conclusions. We believe that our observations about
the Spritzer and Gardenhose samples will apply to other populations, however this
remains an open question.
We notice that the "Spritzer" and "Gardenhose" samples have many characteris-
tics which are similar to what people could expect from random samples e.g., user
activity pattern, retweet ratio, and tweeting frequency distribution. However, we
could not conclude that these samples are truly random samples because we have
observed that the public tweets from certain active users are excluded from the sam-
ples presumably due to their suspected spam behavior. We think it is an interesting
problem for the future works to compare the Twitter "Spritzer" and "Gardenhose"
samples with some truly random samples.
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Chapter 4
K-Anonymity based Social Network
Conversion against Connection
Fingerprint Attacks
In this chapter, we study the privacy protection issue on preparing social network
data for analysis. We discuss a new type of attacks on social network data, which
has not been discovered by prior work, namely connection fingerprint (CFP) at-
tacks. In CFP attacks, malicious adversaries utilize the connection information of
a victim (anonymous) user to some known public users to re-identify the user. We
first formally define CFP attacks and then analyze the privacy risk of these attacks
on real-world social networks. In addition, we adopt the k-anonymity scheme to
convert a social network against CFP attacks. We propose two k-anonymization
algorithms with their own respective advantages and demonstrate their ability to
generate k-anonymized networks with good utility.
4.1 Motivation
Propelled by the emergence and rapid rise of social media within the past decade,
people are now driving interactions online, thus contributing to the vast amount of
user-generated content on online social media platforms. On the one hand, both in-
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dustry and academia are very happy with the blooms of social network data as they
provide lots of new opportunities for business and research. For example, many
firms are investing time and resources in mining social network data so it helps pub-
lic relations, marketing, and sales engage more relevantly with consumers. On the
other hand, the increasing sophistication of information technology with its capacity
to collect, analyze, and disseminate social network data is posing significant threats
to social network users' privacy. A common practice is to release a social network
after removing the real identities of vertices for tasks such as mining and analysis.
However, prior research has demonstrated even though all the personal identifiers
(e.g., names, social security numbers) were removed, an attacker could re-identify a
vertex based on the unique topological structure around it in a social network. The
topological structure includes vertex degree [59], neighborhood [107], subgraph,
distances to hub vertices, and so on [38]. This type of attacks is called structural
re-identification attacks.
v2 v1 v3
v4
v5 v6 v7
ObamaBBCYoutube
Vertex ID Connection fingerprint
v4 {BBC}1 {YouTube, Obama}2
v5 {YouTube}1 {BBC, Obama}2
v6 {Obama}1 {YouTube, BBC}2
v7 {Obama}1 {BBC}2
Figure 4.1: Example of a released social network with public users and the connec-
tion fingerprint information of private users within 2 hops.
Prior work on structural re-identification attacks assumes that the identities of all
social network users are sensitive and should be removed from the released dataset.
However, in reality, not all the identities of social network users are sensitive. Sina
Weibo, a popular Chinese microblogging social network, hosts around 176,700 gov-
ernment accounts (e.g., Hong Kong, Mainland China, Taiwan, and Macau), 110,000
media accounts (e.g., PR Newswire, NBA, People's Daily, and Xinhuanet), and mil-
lions of celebrity accounts (e.g., Boris Johnson, Kevin Rudd, David Cameron, and
Kai-Fu Lee). All these users' identities are public, and they in total account for over
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1% of the overall half billion registered user accounts [93, 96]. Facebook has over
50 million public pages for brands, communities, companies, etc. with 10 or more
likes from the one billion registered profiles by 2013 [24]. These users seek pub-
licity, and they want to influence the social networks. In other words, they do not
consider their identities as privacy, and they prefer their information to be publicly
recognizable.
In this work, we define the group of social network users whose identities are
not sensitive as public users to be distinguished from private users. Releasing the
identities of public users with social network data can benefit both research and the
users themselves. For example, these data can be used for studying the social in-
fluence of government organizations, simulating information propagation through
media, helping corporates make smart targeted advertising plans, and so on. How-
ever, it potentially leads to privacy disclosure of other private users. Take a simple
social network, modeled as an unweighted and undirected graph, in Figure 4.1 as an
example. It has seven vertices representing three public users (i.e., v1, v2, v3) and
four private users (i.e., v4, v5, v6, v7). Assume that the identities of the private users
are removed when this social network is released for certain data analysis tasks, and
an attacker knows that in this social network a user Tom connects with a public
user BBC within 1 hop1. As there is only one anonymous vertex v4 who directly
connects to this public user BBC, the attacker identifies v4 as Tom without any
doubt. In this attack, the attacker infers the identity of an anonymous private user
via the public users that he connects to. In other words, the group of public users
that a private user connects to may leak the identity of the private user. For ease of
presentation, we name the identities of the public users that a user ui connects to as
ui's connection fingerprint (CFP). For instance, fBBCg is the 1st-hop CFP of ver-
tex v4, denoted as CFP1(v4) =fBBCg, and fYoutube, Obamag is the 2nd-hop CFP
of vertex v4, denoted as CFP2(v4) =fYoutube, Obamag. The formal definition of
nth-hop CFP will be presented later in Section 4.2. The table in Figure 4.1 lists the
1The number of hops between two vertices in an unweighted graph is the number of edges on the
shortest path between them.
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v2 v1 v3
v4
v5 v6 v7
ObamaBBCYoutube
v8
v9
(a) Anonymized social network by adding
dummy vertices.
v2 v1 v3
v4
v5 v6 v7
ObamaBBCYoutube
(b) Anonymized social net-
work by modifying edges.
Figure 4.2: Examples of 2-anonymity based on connection fingerprint information.
1st-hop and 2nd-hop CFPs of the private users in the example social network.
In this work, we study re-identification attacks based onCFP information namely
connection fingerprint (CFP) attacks, which have not been well studied by prior
work. First, we formally define the CFP re-identification problem. Next, we ana-
lyze the risk of CFP attacks with real-world network data. Our study demonstrates
that even a small proportion of public users (e.g., 1%) can harm the privacy of a con-
siderable amount of private users. Then, we propose to adopt the widely accepted
k-anonymity strategy to resist CFP attacks. Informally, k-anonymity requires that
for every private user ui in a social network, there are at least k 1 other private users
who share the same CFP as ui, which guarantees that an attacker cannot re-identify
any private users based only on CFP information with probability larger than 1
k
.
We propose two different methods to anonymize social networks against CFP
attacks, and we recognize their respective advantages and limitations. The first
method is based on adding dummy vertices. For example, in Figure 4.2, two dummy
(private) vertices v8 and v9 are added to the network as well as some dummy edges
to connect them to the network. The dummy vertices and edges are signified by
dashed circles and lines. The social network satisfies 2-anonymity (k = 2) in terms
of CFPs (within 2 hops). This is because in the modified social network, for every
private vertex, there is at least one other private vertex having the same 1st-hop and
2nd-hop CFPs. As will be explained later in Section 4.4, this approach can be easily
extended to prevent any CFP attacks within n hops, where 1  n  m, and m is
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the maximum number of hops between two vertices in the network. Although it is
general, this algorithm may limit the utility of released social networks because of
the large number of dummy vertices added. The second method is based on modify-
ing (i.e., adding and/or deleting) edges. Take Figure 4.2b as an example. We insert
an edge between v2 and v4 and another edge between v1 and v5. The social network
then satisfies 2-anonymity based on 1st-hop CFPs since CFP1(v4) = CFP1(v5) =
fBBC; Y outubeg, and CFP1(v6) = CFP1(v7) = fObamag. This approach works
well on preventing CFP attacks of 1 hop and preserves network utility better than
the first method. However, it is hard to extend this approach for n-hop CFP attacks
(n > 1). This will be further explained in Section 4.5.
Finally, we conduct comprehensive experiments to evaluate the performance of
our algorithms. We find that with realistic assumptions of the number of public
users and the privacy parameter k, our algorithms are able to generate anonymized
networks with good utility efficiently.
4.2 Preliminaries and Problem Formulation
We model a social network as an undirected and unweighted graph G(V;E), where
V is a set of vertices representing user entities in the social network, andE is a set of
edges representing social connections between users (e.g., friendships, contacts, and
collaborations). The notation e(vi; vj) 2 E represents an edge between two vertices
vi and vj . We use the notation jSj to represent the cardinality of a set S. For ease of
presentation, we use "graph'' and "social network'' interchangeably in the following
discussion.
Social network data are released for research and analysis with possible modifi-
cations for protecting privacy, e.g., removing user identities. We assume there are
some public users whose identities are not sensitive in a social networkG and hence
are retained in the released social network G as specified in Definition 1. The real
identity of a public vertex vi is denoted by ID(vi). Except the public users, the
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rest of the users in G are private users, whose identities are sensitive and hence are
excluded from the released social network G.
Definition 1 (Released Social Network) The released versionG(V ; E) of a so-
cial networkG(V;E) is obtained by removing all the identity information of private
vertices of G, with possible modifications (i.e., adding dummy vertices and edges,
modifying edges). G(V ; E) is used in place of G for research and analysis, with
V pub  V  (and  V ) referring to the public vertices.
We study the privacy breach in G caused by releasing public user identities.
First, we specify the hop distance h(vi; vj) between two vertices vi and vj as the
number of edges on the shortest path between them 2. Given a hop distance value n,
we give the formal definitions of the nth-hop connection fingerprint CFPn(vj) and
n-range connection fingerprint CFP (vj; n) for a private vertex vj in Definition 2
and Definition 3, respectively. Accordingly, we introduce connection fingerprint
(CFP) re-identification attacks, as stated in Definition 4. This kind of attacks is
initiated by attackers who are aware of the connection fingerprint of a target user.
Definition 2 (nth-Hop Connection Fingerprint) The nth-hop connection finger-
print CFPn(vj) of a private vertex vj in a social network G(V;E) consists of the
group of public vertices whose hop distances to vj are exactly n, i.e., CFPn(vj) =
fID(vi)jvi 2 V pub ^ h(vi; vj) = ng.
Definition 3 (n-Range Connection Fingerprint) The n-range connection finger-
print of a private vertex vj , denoted by CFP (vj; n), is formed by vj 's xth-hop con-
nection fingerprints, where 1  x  n, i.e., CFP (vj; n) = [x2[1;n]fCFPx(vj)g.
We consider then-rangeCFPs of two vertices vi and vj to be the same (i.e.,CFP (vi; n) =
CFP (vj; n)) iff 8x 2 [1; n], CFPx(vi) = CFPx(vj).
Take the social network in Figure 4.1 as an example. The 1st-hop CFP and 2nd-
hop CFP of vertex v4 are fBBCg and fYoutube, Obamag respectively, and v4's 2-
range connection fingerprint CFP (v4; 2)= ffBBCg; fYoutube, Obamagg.
2In an unweighted graph, h(vi; vj) equals the shortest path distance between vi and vj .
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Definition 4 (n-Range Connec. Fingerprint Re-identification) Given a social net-
work G(V;E), its released version G(V ; E), and a target entity vj 2 V   V pub
with n-range connection fingerprint CFP (vj; n), let the group of the private ver-
tices in G sharing the same n-range connection fingerprint as vj be vj 's candi-
dates, denoted by VCFP (vj ;n), i.e., VCFP (vj ;n) = fv 2 V    V pub jCFP (v; n) =
CFP (vj; n)g. If jVCFP (vj ;n)j  jV    V pubj, vj has high probability to be re-
identified.
We adopt the k-anonymity notion as formally stated in Definition 5, to prevent n-
range CFP attacks. Given a k-anonymized network, assume that an attacker knows
there is a target private user u in the social network having the connection fingerprint
CFP (u; n). She performs the re-identification attack and finds a group of x can-
didate vertices having the same n-range CFP as u. According to the k-anonymity
notion, x  k. Without further information, the attacker cannot differentiate these
x vertices, and the probability for her to identify u among these x vertices is 1
x
 1
k
.
Therefore, the k-anonymity notion prevents re-identification attacks by providing an
upper bound (i.e., 1
k
) for re-identification probability. The larger the k, the smaller
the upper bound, and hence the lower the risk of identity disclosure.
Definition 5 (K-Anonymity) A released social network G(V ; E) satisfies k-
anonymity with respect to n-range connection fingerprint information, iff for each
private vertex vj 2 V    V pub, there are at least k   1 other private vertices
v0 2 V    V pub   fvjg with CFP (v0; n) = CFP (v; n).
Our objective is to design an algorithm to efficiently convert a social network
so that it achieves k-anonymity against n-range CFP re-identification attacks. The
algorithm should make as few changes to the social network as possible to preserve
the utility of the network so that the anonymized network can be used for research.
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Table 4.1: Properties of networks
Datasets polblogs facebook grqc route-view
jV j 1222 4039 4158 6474
jEj 16714 88234 13422 12572
Density 0.0224 0.0108 0.0015 0.0006
Diameter 8 8 17 9
Avg. clustering coef. 0.226 0.519 0.629 0.009
4.3 Privacy Risk Analysis
In this section, we use experiments to evaluate the vulnerability of social networks
under n-range CFP re-identification attacks. We perform the evaluation on four
real-world networks described as follows.
The polblogs network was crawled from the US political blogosphere in 2005.
The vertices are blogs of a set of US politicians, and an edge between two blogs rep-
resents there is a hyperlink from one blog to the other [1]. The facebook network
was collected from the survey participants using a Facebook app. The vertices are
Facebook users, and an edge between two users represents the established friend-
ship between them [65]. The grqc network is a collaboration network collected from
e-print arXiv. It covers scientific collaborations between the authors of the papers
submitted to the General Relativity and Quantum Cosmology category. The vertices
are authors, and the edges represent coauthorship [56]. Route-view is a network of
autonomous systems of the Internet connected with each other. The vertices are
autonomous systems, and the edges denote communication [56]. All the networks
are represented by undirected and unweighted graphs with no isolated vertices. Ta-
ble 4.1 presents some basic statistics of the networks.
The four real-world networks do not contain public user identities. In other
words, all the vertices in the networks are anonymous. In order to evaluate the
risk of CFP attacks, we select a set of vertices in each network and assume that their
identities are public. Then, based on these public vertices, we generate the CFPs of
the remaining private vertices and evaluate how many private vertices can poten-
tially be re-identified via the CFP information. We adopt three different strategies
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to select public vertices.
The degree based strategy, referred to asDegree, chooses the vertices with the
highest numbers of adjacent edges (i.e., degree) as public vertices. This is based on
the assumption that public users in a social network such as celebrities and news me-
dia users normally have much larger degree compared with ordinary users because
of their popularity.
The degree probability strategy, referred to asDegreep, also picks public ver-
tices based on degree information. The probability that it picks a vertex is propor-
tional to the vertex's degree. In this way, it does not only pick vertices with the
highest degree values, but also some vertices with lower degree.
The random strategy, referred to as Random, simply chooses public vertices
uniformly randomly from a network.
Based on the public vertex set of a network, we calculate the n-range CFPs
of the private vertices and then evaluate the risk of the private vertices under re-
identification attacks. We group the private vertices based on their n-range CFPs.
The private vertices with the same n-range CFP are grouped together as an equiva-
lent group, denoted asEG. An attacker cannot differentiate the vertices in an equiv-
alent group based only on CFPs. Therefore, given a vertex in an equivalent group
EGi, the probability that an attacker can re-identify it is at most 1/jEGij, referred
to as its maximum re-identification probability. Given a privacy parameter k, k-
anonymity requires that the maximum re-identification probability of every private
vertex should be no larger than 1/k. The vertices with maximum re-identification
probability larger than 1/k are considered to be potentially at risk of re-identification
attacks. We calculate the percentage of private vertices in each network which are
potentially at risk of CFP attacks based on varying proportions of public vertices
selected, denoted as p, hop numbers n, and privacy thresholds k.
Figure 4.3 shows the percentage of vulnerable private vertices in each network
with varying proportions of public vertices p. We observe from the figure that gener-
ally the percentage of vulnerable vertices increases significantly with the proportion
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Figure 4.3: Percentage of vulnerable vertices in each social network varying with
proportion of public vertices (k = 5; h = 2).
of public vertices. It means that the more the public users in a network, the more
vulnerable the network is to CFP attacks. Moreover, we observe from the figure
that theDegree strategy causes the most number of vulnerable private vertices, fol-
lowed by the Degreep strategy. Randomly chosen public vertices have a relatively
low impact on re-identifying private vertices. Therefore, the public vertices with the
highest degree values threaten the identity privacy of private users the most. Across
the four networks evaluated, we find there are considerable portions of private ver-
tices that are vulnerable to CFP attacks. For example, with a moderate proportion
of public vertices (e.g., 0:01) chosen based on theDegree strategy, there are around
70% of the private vertices that may be at risk of CFP attacks in the polblogs net-
work, and this percentage is between 10% and 40% in the other three networks. If
the proportion of public vertices increases to 0:05, the percentage of vulnerable ver-
tices rises to more than 90% in the polblogs network and to around 50% in the other
three networks 3.
3The differences of the vulnerable vertex percentages in the polblogs network and the other three
networks are caused by different network density. The other three networks are sparser than the
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ble vertices increases with privacy
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(p = 0:01; n = 2).
In Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5, we fix the proportion of public vertices at 0:01, and
show how the percentage of potentially risky vertices changes with the hop number
n and privacy threshold k increasing, respectively. We only present the results on the
polblogs network, and the results on the other three networks have similar trends.
It is not surprising that the larger the hop number n or the threshold k, the more
vertices are vulnerable to re-identification attacks. When the hop number n is larger
than 1, the percentage of vulnerable vertices increases greatly.
To sumup, in this section, we verify the practicability of CFP-based re-identification
attacks. The results on real-world networks demonstrate that the re-identification
risk is real and could be very serious sometimes.
4.4 DummyVertexAddition basedAnonymization for
n-Range CFP Attacks
In this section, we design a k-anonymization algorithm to protect a social network
against n-range CFP attacks based on adding dummy vertices. The main idea, al-
though simple, is effective. It first groups the private vertices in a social network
G into equivalent groups such that vertices in the same group have the same n-
range CFP. Then, for every equivalent groupEGi with less than k vertices, it inserts
polblogs network. They may contain a large set of private vertices that do not connect to any public
vertices thus are not vulnerable to CFP attacks.
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Algorithm 1: K-anonymity algorithm for n-range CFP attacks.
Input: A social network G(V;E), privacy parameter k, hop parameter n
Output: A k-anonymized social network G(V ; E)
G(V ; E) = G(V;E);1
8v 2 V    V pub, calculate CFP (v; n);2
Group vertices in V    V pub into equivalent groups EGs;3
foreach EGi do4
if jEGij < k then5
Insert k   jEGij+  ( > 0) dummy vertices into EGi;6
foreach dummy vertex vd inserted do7
Pick a non-dummy vertex vi randomly in EGi;8
For every e(vi; vj) 2 E, insert e(vd; vj) to E;9
foreach e(vd; vj) inserted, vj is a private vertex do10
Find the equivalent group EGj containing vj ;11
Randomly pick a vertex vt 2 EGj ;12
Remove e(vd; vj), and insert e(vd; vt);13
return G;14
k   jEGij+  dummy vertices and connects each dummy vertex carefully with the
vertices in G so that it has the same n-range CFP as other vertices in EGi. Here, 
is a very small positive integer 4. In this way, all the equivalent groups contain at
least k vertices and hence the social network satisfies k-anonymity.
Algorithm 1 provides the pseudo-code of the k-anonymization algorithm for n-
range CFP attacks. In the algorithm, an important step is to insert a dummy vertex
vd into the social network (line 7-13). To achieve k-anonymity, we must make sure
that vd has the same n-range CFP as other vertices in the same equivalent group
EGi, and the n-range CFPs of other private vertices in the social network are not
affected. In order to achieve this, for a dummy vertex vd to be inserted into an
equivalent group EGi, we first pick a real vertex vi from EGi and then copy all
the edges of vi to vd (line 8-9). In other words, vd becomes an exact duplicate of
vi since it connects to exactly the same set of neighbor vertices as vi. Obviously,
CFP (vd; n) = CFP (vi; n), and the n-range CFPs of all the other vertices remain
unchanged. This clearly satisfies our requirements for inserting dummy vertices
into a social network. However, the existence of the dummy vertex may be easily
recognized because it connects to exactly the same set of neighbors as another vertex.
4We choose  randomly in the range [0; k).
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To make the dummy vertex less recognizable, for each inserted edge e(vd; vj)where
vj is a private vertex, we randomly perform an edge switching operation. To be
more specific, we replace e(vd; vj) with an edge e(vd; vt) with vj and vt in the same
equivalent group. As stated in Lemma 1, this edge switching operation does not
change the n-range CFPs of any private vertices including vd.
vx
vi vj
vd vt
hh′
(a) Before switch.
vx
vi vj
vd vt
hh′
(b) After switch.
Figure 4.6: vi and vd are in the same equivalent group having the same n-range CFP.
Switching edge e(vd; vj) to edge e(vd; vt)where vj and vt are in the same equivalent
group does not change the n-range CFPs of any vertices.
Lemma 1 Assume a dummy vertex vd is a duplicate of a real vertex vi of an equiv-
alent group EQa, with both connecting to a vertex vj in an equivalent group EQb.
If we replace an edge e(vd; vj) with an edge e(vd; vt), where vt 2 EQb, none of the
private vertices' n-range CFPs will be changed.
Proof 1 As shown in Figure 4.6, we assume vertex vi is in an equivalent groupEQa,
and vertices vj and vt are in an equivalent group EQb 5. The equivalent groups
are signified by dotted circles. After we insert a dummy vertex vd into EQa as a
duplicate of vi, both vi and vd are connected to vj but not vt (see Figure 4.6a). At
this moment, vi and vd have the same n-range CFP, and vj and vt have the same
n-range CFP. Then we perform an edge switch by replacing the edge e(vd; vj) with
the edge e(vd; vt) (see Figure 4.6b). We first prove that the n-range CFPs of vj
and vt are not changed by this edge switching operation. We perform the proof by
contradiction.
5EQa and EQb can be the same equivalent group. It does not affect the proof and conclusion.
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Without loss of generality, we assume the xth-hop CFPs (x 2 [1; n]) of vj and/or
vt are changed. To be more specific, we assume there is a public vertex vx which is in
the xth-hop CFPs of vj and vt before the edge switch, i.e., h(vx; vj) = h(vx; vt) = x.
We assume the hop distances from vi and vd to vx are h and h0 respectively, as shown
in the figure. According to the definition of hop distance (i.e., shortest path distance),
x  1 + h and x  1 + h0. After the edge switch, we assume the hop distances
from vj and/or vt to vx are changed. The edge switch has two steps i.e., deleting
e(vd; vj) and adding e(vd; vt). In the following, we prove both steps will not change
the hop distances from vj and vt to vx. Deleting e(vd; vj) removes a path from vj
to vx via vd with a length of 1 + h0. It changes the hop distance from vj to vx only
if x = 1 + h0 < 1 + h when the original shortest path from vj to vx crosses vd.
Therefore, we have h0 < h which is not valid. This is because vi and vd are in the
same equivalent group EQa and h0 = x   1 < n, therefore, vx 2 CFPh0(vd) and
hence vx 2 CFPh0(vi). In other words, h0 = h. Therefore, we know that the hop
distance from vj to vx is not changed. Then, adding e(vd; vt) creates a new path
from vt to vx via vd with a length of 1+h0. It changes the hop distance from vt to vx
only if x > 1 + h0 when the original shortest path from vt to vx is replaced by this
path. Then this contradicts the previous statement that x  1 + h0. Therefore, the
hop distance from vt to vx is not changed as well. Since the hop distances from vj
and vt to the public vertices within n range do not change, the n-range CFPs of vj
and vt do not change.
As the n-range CFPs of vj and vt remain the same after the edge switch, the
n-range CFP of vd dose not change. This is because any public vertex that vd can
reach within n-hop via vj before the switch can be reached by vd via vt by exactly
the same number of hops after the switch. Therefore, the n-range CFP of vd remains
the same. Since the n-range CFPs (i.e., the hop distances to public vertices) of the
vertices which are directly affected by the edge switching operation (i.e., vd, vj , and
vt) are not changed, the n-range CFPs of the other vertices in the network will not
change as well. Our proof completes.
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4.5 EdgeModification basedAnonymization for 1-Range
CFP Attacks
In Section 4.4, we proposed a k-anonymization algorithm based on adding dummy
vertices to effectively protect a social network against n-range CFP attacks (n 
1). However, adding many dummy vertices to a social network may greatly af-
fect the utility of the network. Therefore, in this section, we propose another k-
anonymization algorithm purely based on modifying edges, which makes less dam-
age to network utility. However, this algorithm is only applicable to resisting 1-
range CFP attacks, and it is hard to be extended to prevent n-range CFP attacks
when n > 1.
In order to convert a social network to achieve k-anonymity by edge modifica-
tions only, we need to group the private vertices into groups of size at least k. For
private vertices in the same group, we modify their edges so that they connect to
the same set of public vertices (i.e., their 1st-hop CFPs are identical). To facilitate
the comparison of their 1st-hop CFPs, we use a standard binary vector to represent
CFP1(v) for every private vertex v. Each bit in the binary vector corresponds to a
public vertex vpub in G. If vpub presents in CFP1(v), the bit is on (i.e., set to one);
otherwise the bit is off (i.e., set to zero). Take the social network depicted in Fig-
ure 4.1 as an example. Since there are 3 public vertices, a 3-bit vector is employed
with the bits corresponding to v1, v2, and v3 respectively. Then, vector 100 repre-
sents CFP1(v4) as v4 only connects to BBC (i.e., v1), and vector 010 represents
CFP1(v5) as v5 only connects to Y outube (i.e., v2).
In order to preserve the utility of the network, we prefer to modify only a small
number of edges. Therefore, the groups should be formed carefully. Then, given a
group of private vertices, their 1st-hop CFPs in the form of binary vectors should
be changed to the median center defined by Hamming distance 6. For each vertex
v in the group, the Hamming distance between the binary vertex corresponding to
6The median center of a set of binary vectors is itself a binary vector which has the same inter-
pretation as the individuals.
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Algorithm 2: Greedy clustering algorithm for 1-range CFP attacks.
Input: A social network G(V;E), privacy parameter k
Output: A clustering of the private vertices CG
CG = ;;1
Vnc = fvijvi 2 V   Vpubg;2
8v 2 V   Vpub, calculate CFP1(v);3
foreach vi 2 Vnc do4
Cvi = vi [NeareastNeighbor(vi; Vnc; k   1);5
while Ctemp = fCvi jCvi  Vncg 6= ; do6
Find Cvi = argmin
Cvi2Ctemp
cost(Cvi);
7
CG = add(Cvi ; CG);8
Vnc = Vnc   Cvi ;9
while jVncj  k do10
Pick a vertex vj 2 Vnc randomly;11
Cvj = vj [NeareastNeighbor(vj ; Vnc; k   1);12
CnewG = assign(Cvj ; CG);13
if cost(Cvj ) < (cost(CnewG )  cost(CG)) then14
CG = add(Cvj ; CG);15
else16
CG = CnewG ;17
Vnc = Vnc   Cvj ;18
if Vnc is not empty then19
CG = assign(Vnc; CG);20
return CG;21
CFP1(v) and the median center reflects the number of edges of v that need to be
modified. We then introduce the anonymization cost of a group as the total number
of edges that need to be changed, considering all the vertices in the group. Based on
this new measure, the 1-range CFP k-anonymizaiton problem can be reformed as a
cost minimization clustering problem, formally presented in Definition 6.
Definition 6 (1-range CFP k-anonymizaiton problem) Given a social networkG
and 1-range CFPs of all the private vertices, the 1-range CFP k-anonymizaiton
problem is to cluster the private vertices to non-overlapping groups of size at least
k and minimize the sum of the anonymization cost of every group.
Wepropose a greedy clustering algorithm to solve the 1-rangeCFP k-anonymization
problem. The main strategy is to cluster each private vertex with at least k  1 other
private vertices having similar 1-range CFPs to reduce group anonymization cost.
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Algorithm 3: Algorithm for assigning vertices to existing clusters assign(C; CG).
Input: A group of vertices C that need to be assigned, the existing cluster set CG
Output: A new cluster set CG
foreach vertex v 2 C do1
Find the cluster Ci 2 CG nearest to v;2
Ci = add(v; Ci);3
if jCij  2k then4
// split the cluster to two clusters
Find two vertices vl; vt 2 Ci which have the largest distance among all pairs5
of vertices in Ci;
C0i = fvlg, C1i = fvtg;6
Ci = Ci   fvl; vtg;7
while Ci is not empty do8
Find a vertex vx which is the nearest to vl;9
C0i = add(vx; C
0
i );10
Ci = Ci   fvxg;11
if Ci is not empty then12
Find a vertex vy which is the nearest to vt;13
C1i = add(vy; C
1
i );14
Ci = Ci   fvyg;15
Remove Ci from CG;16
CG = add(fC0i ; C1i g; CG)17
return CG;18
Note, with the binary vector representation, we employ Hamming distance to quan-
tify the similarity of two 1-range CFPs. Then, we can adopt existing k nearest neigh-
bor search algorithms for the clustering process. The clustering process is sketched
in Algorithm 2.
The algorithm takes a social networkG and a privacy parameter k as inputs, and
it partitions all the private vertices of G into disjoint clusters such that the size of
every cluster is no less than k, and vertices in the same cluster have identical 1-range
CFPs. In the algorithm, we first define a set CG to store resulting clusters, which is
initialized to an empty set (line 1). Then, we form a vertex set Vnc containing all
the private vertices that have not yet been assigned to a cluster (line 2). For each
unassigned vertex vi 2 Vnc, we search for its k   1 nearest neighbors based on
Hamming distance corresponding to 1st-hop CFP vectors. vi and its k   1 nearest
neighbors form a group of size k (i.e., Cvi) (line 4-5). Among all the jVncj nearest
neighbor groups, we choose the group with the lowest anonymization cost and at
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the same time, not overlapping with any existing clusters in CG to form a cluster,
and remove the vertices in the chosen nearest neighbor group from Vnc. The process
repeats until none of the remaining nearest neighbor groups satisfies the conditions
(lines 6-9).
Because we purposely only convert a nearest neighbor group to a cluster if it does
not overlap with any existing clusters, it is very likely there are still some vertices
in Vnc not yet assigned to any clusters. Two options are available to further process
these unassigned vertices. We can either construct new clusters for those unassigned
vertices or assign them to existing clusters. We decide which option to execute based
on the anonymization cost that they cause. In other words, we always execute the one
with lower anonymization cost (lines 10-18). To be more specific, for an unassigned
vertex, we reform the nearest neighbor group by searching for its k   1 nearest
neighbors in Vnc (line 12). We can form a new cluster with this nearest neighbor
group. Alternatively, we can assign the vertices in this group to the existing clusters
in CG via the function assign(C; CG), whose details will be given later (line 13).
To decide which option to execute, we compare the anonymization cost incurred by
adding a new cluster with the total anonymization cost incurred by assigning these
vertices to existing clusters (line 14), and we execute the one with lower cost (lines
15-17). We repeat the above process until the number of the remaining vertices
in Vnc is smaller than k. As cluster size must be no smaller than k, the remaining
vertices cannot form a new cluster, thus we assign them to existing clusters (line 20).
As mentioned before, the function assign(C; CG) is to assign a group of ver-
tices C to the existing clusters in CG, and Algorithm 3 provides the details. For each
vertex v in C, we assign it to its nearest cluster (lines 2-3). Here, the distance be-
tween a vertex v and a cluster Ci is measured by the Hamming distance between
the binary vector corresponding to CFP1(v) and the binary vector representing the
median center of Ci. As assign(C; CG) keeps adding vertices to existing clusters,
the size of clusters increases. In order to prevent a cluster from being over-sized, we
propose a cluster splitting operation. To be more specific, when the size of a cluster
68
Ci 2 CG reaches 2k or larger, Ci is split into two new clusters to cut down overall
anonymization cost. As stated in Lemma 2, the total anonymization cost of the two
new clusters will always be lower than that of the original cluster no matter how we
split the cluster. However, to gain a large reduction in anonymization cost, we adopt
a greedy splitting process to make sure that vertices in the same new cluster have
similar 1st-hop CFPs, and the distance between the two new clusters is large (lines
5-17).
In the following, we detail the cluster splitting process. Firstly, we locate a pair
of vertices vl and vt among all pairs of vertices in Ci with the maximum Hamming
distance and then form two new clusters C0i and C1i around vl and vt respectively
(lines 5-6). In order to meet the cluster size requirement, we split the rest of the
vertices in Ci evenly between C0i and C1i so that each of the new clusters will have
size no smaller than k. We locate the nearest vertex to vl or vt in an alternate fashion
until all the remaining vertices in Ci are assigned (lines 8-17).
Lemma 2 Given a group of binary vectors C, let C0 and C1 be two subgroups such
thatC0[C1 = C andC0\C1 = ;. Suppose vectors c, c0, and c1 signify the median
centers of C, C0, and C1 respectively,
P
v2C0 dist(v; c0) +
P
v2C1 dist(v; c1) P
v2C dist(v; c), where dist() calculates Hamming distance.
Proof 2 The proof of this lemma is very simple. According to its definition, the me-
dian center of a group of vectors is the vector to which the sum of the distance
from every member in the group is minimized. Therefore,
P
v2C0 dist(v; c0) P
v2C0 dist(v; c) and
P
v2C1 dist(v; c1) 
P
v2C1 dist(v; c). Because C0 [ C1 =
C, we have
P
v2C0 dist(v; c0) +
P
v2C1 dist(v; c1) 
P
v2C dist(v; c).
4.6 Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we conduct comprehensive experiments to evaluate the performance
of the proposed k-anonymizaiton algorithms and report the results. We use four
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real-world networks in the experiments including polblogs, facebook, grqc, and
route-view, which were introduced in Section 4.3.
We evaluate the performance of the algorithms based on utility and time effi-
ciency. We use centrality, a class of important network metrics, to evaluate the
utility of the k-anonymized networks generated by the algorithms. The centrality of
a vertex measures its relative importance in a network. Many network applications
are developed based on centrality metrics, such as user influence analysis, informa-
tion diffusion, and network robustness analysis. In this work, we evaluate four basic
centrality metrics [95] listed as follows.
 The degree centrality (DGE) of a vertex v is defined as the number of edges
adjacent to v.
 The closeness centrality (CLS) of a vertex v is defined as the inverse of the
sum of its shortest path distances to all the other vertices, i.e., jV j 1P
8vi 6=v2V h(v;vi)
.
 Betweenness centrality (BTW) quantifies the number of times a vertex acts
as a bridge along the shortest path between two other vertices.
 PageRank centrality (PRK)measures the influence of a vertex in a network.
It assigns relative scores to all the vertices in the network. The score of a
vertex is defined recursively and depends on the number and scores of all the
vertices it connects to. A vertex that connects to many high-score vertices
receives a high score itself.
Given a network G and an anonymized network G generated based on G, we
evaluate the utility of G based on the similarity of the centrality scores of vertices
in G and G. Given a centrality function referred to as cscore() and a set of ver-
tices Ve that we would like to evaluate, we calculate the centrality scores of every
vertex v 2 Ve in G and G, signified by cscore(v;G) and cscore(v;G) respec-
tively. Then, we employ two metrics to evaluate the similarity of the centrality
scores, i.e., the utility of G. The first is the average change ratio of centrality
(i.e., Avgv2Ve
jcscore(v;G) cscore(v;G)j
cscore(v;G)
). A small average change ratio indicates that
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the centralities of the vertices are similar in G and G. The second is Spearman's
rank correlation coefficient (SRCC) [71]. To calculate this value, we rank the ver-
tices in descending order of their centrality scores in G and G respectively. SRCC
is then calculated by
P
v2Ve (r
G
v  rG)(rG

v  rG )qP
v2Ve (r
G
v  rG)2
qP
v2G (rG

v  rG )2
, where rGv and rG

v are the
ranks of a vertex v in G and G respectively, and rG and rG are the mean values
of the ranks of all the evaluated vertices in G and G respectively. It evaluates the
linear dependency of the centrality rankings of the same set of vertices inG andG.
Its value is in the range of [ 1; 1]. The value is close to 1 if the rankings of the
vertices in G and G are strongly correlated, the value is close to 0 when the rank-
ings are uncorrelated, and the value is close to  1 when the rankings are inversely
correlated.
The experiments are performed on the datasets where public users are selected
based on vertex degree (i.e., the degree based strategy in Section 4.3). According
to the risk analysis, public users with the highest degree values cause the highest
privacy risk. Accordingly, to achieve anonymity, we expect more modifications to
networks, which result in larger utility loss. We evaluate the utility performance of
our algorithms in this worst-case scenario.
In the following, we first evaluate the n-range CFP anonymization algorithm
presented in Section 4.4 and then the 1-range CFP anonymization algorithm pre-
sented in Section 4.5. Note these two algorithms are designed based on different
principles, so we evaluate them separately. In addition, the 1-range CFP anonymi-
zation algorithm is less flexible than the n-range CFP anonymization algorithm as
it is designed to only support 1-range CFP anonymization and not extendable for
n-range CFP anonymization. However, it is more effective for preserving network
utility compared with the general n-range CFP anonymization algorithm. It actually
is able to preserve other important types of network utility in addition to centrality.
We further demonstrate its capability of preserving other types of network utility
with a new set of experiments, to be presented in Section 4.6.3.
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Figure 4.7: Average change ratio of every centrality property changes with propor-
tion of public vertices (k = 5; n = 2).
4.6.1 Evaluating n-Range CFP Anonymization Algorithm
In this section, we evaluate the general n-range CFP anonymization algorithm. Be-
cause this algorithm anonymizes a network by adding dummy vertices which cannot
be differentiated from the real private vertices in the anonymized network, we cannot
effectively align the private vertices of the original network with those of the anony-
mized network and evaluate their centrality changes. In addition, it is expected that
the algorithm will change many general network properties (e.g., diameter and den-
sity). However, we use experiments to show that the algorithm can preserve the
centrality of public users 7.
Figure 4.7 and Figure 4.8 present the average change ratio and SRCC changes of
the four centrality metrics with the proportion of public users p increasing, respec-
tively. In the experiments, we set the privacy threshold k at 5 and the hop number
n at 2. Generally, from these two figures, we observe that the utility of the anony-
mized networks degrades (i.e., the average change ratio increases, and the SRCC
7To make centrality scores comparable between two networks with different numbers of vertices,
we use normalized centrality scores.
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Figure 4.8: Spearsman's rank correlation coefficient of every centrality property
changes with proportion of public vertices (k = 5; n = 2).
decreases) as p increases. It is consistent with our intuition that the more users'
identities are released as public, the more privacy risk they cause, thus, the more
utility is sacrificed to protect privacy. We further observe that for the polblogs net-
work, the average change ratios are small under all the settings (i.e., less than 25%).
Therefore, the algorithm is able to preserve the centrality of the public vertices well
in this network. On the other hand, we find that for some networks (e.g., facebook
and grqc), the average change ratios of some centrality metrics (e.g., DEG, BTW,
and PRK) are small only when p is small (e.g., p  0:01). The reason that the algo-
rithm performs differently on preserving centrality on different networks is because
these networks have different structures. However, the more specific relationships
are yet to be discovered. Although our algorithm may cause large changes on the
raw centrality scores sometimes, the SRCC values always remain close to 1 (see Fig-
ure 4.8). It demonstrates that our algorithm can preserve the ranks of public vertices
based on centrality very well, which is useful for many applications, e.g., finding the
most influential public users in social networks to initiate information propagation.
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Figure 4.9: Utility degrades as privacy threshold k increases on the polblogs network
(p = 0:01; n = 2).
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Figure 4.10: Utility degrades as hop number n increases on the polblogs network
(p = 0:01; k = 5).
Figure 4.9 and Figure 4.10 show the utility of anonymized networks changes
with the privacy threshold k and hop number n increasing, respectively. We only
show the results on the polblogs network since the results on the other networks have
similar trends. Unsurprisingly, we find that utility degrades as k andn increase. With
a relatively large k or n value (e.g., k = 10 or n = 3), our algorithmmay cause large
changes on some centrality scores (e.g., BTW and PRK). However, it preserves the
centrality ranks of public vertices well as we find that the SRCC values are close to
1.
In addition to utility, we also evaluate the time performance of the n-range CFP
anonymization algorithm 8. Figure 5.21 reports the running time of this algorithm
with increasing p, k, and n. We find that the running time increases slightly with
p and k, and the algorithm is very efficient as the running time does not exceed 5
8We run the experiments on a server with 3.07GHz CPU and 128G RAM running a 64-bit win-
dows OS.
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Figure 4.11: Time performance of the n-range CFP anonymization algorithm.
seconds on all the four tested networks even with large p and k (n = 2). We also
find that the running time is much more sensitive to the change of the hop number
n. When n is larger than 3, the running time increases rapidly. This is caused by
the expensive cost of calculating the n-range CFP of every private vertex, which is
based on breath-first network traversal. However, we think it is very hard for an
attacker to learn the CFPs of target users beyond 3 hops in real-life situations. In
addition, we find that the running time on the facebook and route-view networks
is significantly longer than that on the other two networks. It is because facebook
and route-view have the largest number of vertices and the highest edge density
respectively.
To sum up, we use extensive experiments to evaluate the performance of the n-
range CFP anonymizaion algorithm. We find that this algorithm runs very efficiently
on different networks. It causes small changes to the raw centrality scores of public
vertices when p, k, and n values are small, and it can preserve the ranks of public
vertices based on centrality very well.
4.6.2 Evaluating 1-Range CFP Anonymization Algorithm
In the second set of experiments, we evaluate the special 1-range CFP anonymiation
algorithm. Because this algorithm is implemented based on edge modifications and
does not add dummy vertices to networks, we can easily align the private vertices in
an original network with those in the corresponding anonymized network and eval-
uate the utility (e.g., centrality) of the anonymized network based on all vertices but
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Figure 4.12: Average change ratio of every centrality property changes with propor-
tion of public vertices (k = 5).
not only public vertices. We evaluate the utility of an anonymized network based
on the four centrality metrics mentioned earlier. For each centrality metric, we cal-
culate the average change ratio and SRCC based on all vertices in a network but not
only public vertices.
Figure 4.12 and Figure 4.13 present the average change ratio and SRCC changes
of the four centrality metrics with the proportion of public users p increasing, respec-
tively. In the experiments, we set the privacy threshold k at 5, and the hop number n
is always 1. From Figure 4.12, we observe that our algorithm is able to preserve the
DEG and PRK centrality scores well. The average change ratios of these two cen-
tralitymetrics are always smaller than 22%on all the four tested networks. However,
for the CLS and BTW centrality, we find the average change ratios become very
large when p exceeds 0:005. This is mainly caused by a small number of outlier ver-
tices which are previously at the boundary of a network with very small centrality.
After the anonymization, they are moved to more "central" positions in the network
with large centrality. These changes incur a few extremely large centrality change
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Figure 4.13: Spearsman's rank correlation coefficient of every centrality property
changes with proportion of public vertices (k = 5).
ratios, which are responsible for the very large average change ratios. Despite the
large average change ratios, we find the SRCC values are always close to 1 for all
the four evaluated centrality metrics as shown in Figure 4.13. It demonstrates that
our algorithm can well preserve the centrality ranks of vertices.
Figure 4.14 reports the utility performance of the 1-range CFP anonymization
algorithm changes with the privacy threshold k. We only show the results on the
polblogs network but ignore the results on the other networks as they are very sim-
ilar. We find in the figure that the average change ratios increase as k increases.
They grow noticeably large when k exceeds a large value (e.g., 10), but the SRCC
values remain almost 1 for all the tested centrality metrics.
We also evaluate the time cost of the 1-range CFP anonymiation algorithm and
show the results in Figure 4.15. As observed from Figure 4.15a, the time cost of
the algorithm slightly increases as p increases. It is because the algorithm greatly
relies on the NN search of vertices based on 1st-hop CFPs. The number of public
vertices affects the length of the 1st-hop CFP vector, and a long 1st-hop CFP vec-
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Figure 4.14: Utility degrades as privacy threshold k increases on the polblogs net-
work (p = 0:01).
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Figure 4.15: Time performance of the 1-range CFP anonymization algorithm.
tor results in long time for calculating the distance between two vectors in the NN
search. However, there are no obvious relationships between time cost and the pri-
vacy threshold k based on the results shown in Figure 4.15b. Moreover, we find that
running time is also affected by the number of vertices in a network, which directly
affects the running time of the NN search. In the experiments, the route-view net-
work takes the longest running time, which is still less than 12 seconds under all the
tested parameter settings.
4.6.3 Utility performance on other network properties
The previous experiments evaluate the utility performance of the proposed algo-
rithms based on centrality. In this section, we demonstrate that the 1-range CFP
anonymization algorithm is not only able to preserve centrality utility but also some
other important types of network utility such as community structure and shortest
paths.
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Figure 4.16: Community structure utility performance (k = 5).
We evaluate community structure utility by running a community detection al-
gorithm on an anonymized network and the corresponding original network respec-
tively and compare the generated communities. We use Clauset and Newman's clas-
sic greedy community detection algorithm for large social networks [22] to generate
communities and use two standard metrics, namely Rand index (Rand) and normal-
ized mutual information (NMI) [30], to compare the communities generated on an
anonymized network with those of the corresponding original network. The Rand
index is the ratio of the number of vertex pairs correctly clustered in both community
partitions (i.e., either in the same or in different communities) to the total number
of pairs. It has a value between 0 and 1, with 0 indicating that the two community
partitions do not agree on any pair of vertices and 1 indicating that the partitions are
exactly the same. Normalized mutual information is an information theory-based
metric. It evaluates how much extra information one needs to infer one partition
given the other. It equals 1 if the partitions are identical, whereas it has an expected
value of 0 if the partitions are independent.
Figure 4.16 reports the results on the four tested networks with increasing p.
As we can see in Figure 4.16a, the Rand index values are always very high (i.e.,
close to 1). However, the high Rand index values can be caused by the agreement
of community partitions on the pairs of vertices which are not partitioned in the
same community when there are many communities detected. Therefore, we further
calculate the NMI metric and report the results in Figure 4.16b. We observe that, on
the polblogs and facebook networks, the NMI values are high for every p setting,
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Figure 4.17: Shortest path utility performance (k = 5).
while on the other two networks, the NMI values are low when p is larger than
0:01. Therefore, the 1-range CFP algorithm is able to preserve network community
structure when p is small (e.g., 1%).
We also evaluate shortest path utility. We calculate the all pair shortest paths of
an anonymized network and the corresponding original network, and compare the
shortest path lengths of the two networks. We evaluate the change ratio of network
diameter, which is the length of the longest shortest path in a network, and the aver-
age change ratio of the shortest path lengths between all pairs of vertices. Figure 4.17
shows the results. We find that on the four tested networks, both the change ratio
of diameter and the average change ratio of all-pair shortest path lengths are low.
It means that the 1-range CFP anonymization algorithm is able to preserve network
shortest path length information.
To sum up, in this section, we evaluate the anonymization algorithm proposed
specially for 1-range CFP attacks. We find that with small p and k settings, this edge
modification-based algorithm is able to preserve many different types of network
utility, such as centrality, community, and shortest path lengths, of all vertices in a
network but not only the centrality of public vertices.
4.7 Summary
In this Chapter, we study a new type of re-identification attacks, namely connection
fingerprint (CFP) attacks, on social networks, in which an attacker re-identifies a pri-
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vate user in a social network based on his connection information with some known
public users in the network. With a formal risk analysis on real-world networks,
we find that CFP attacks can cause serious damage to identity privacy. Therefore,
we propose two efficient network conversion algorithms against CFP attacks based
on the notion of k-anonymity. The first algorithm is based on adding dummy ver-
tices. It can resist powerful attackers with the connection information of a user with
the public users within n hops (n  1). Our experimental results show that it can
preserve the centrality utility of public users. The other algorithm is based on edge
modifications. It is only able to resist attackers with the connection information of a
user with the public users within 1 hop but preserves a rich spectrum of network util-
ity such as centrality, community, and shortest path lengths, of all users in a network
but not only public users.
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Chapter 5
High-UtilityK-Anonymization for
Social Network Conversion
In this chapter, we discuss another aspect of a good privacy preserving network con-
version scheme: utility. Utility is important because it directly affects the quality
of converted social networks, which is crucial to the success of subsequent analy-
sis tasks. Prior work converts a social network to achieve k-anonymity to protect
privacy and preserves the utility of the converted network by minimizing a utility
loss function evaluated by the number of edges modified on the network during the
conversion. In this work, we find this simple utility benchmark is inadequate to
preserve the utility of networks with complex structure. To improve utility perfor-
mance, we propose a new utility benchmark which is defined by the changes that
a network conversion algorithm makes to network community structure. In addi-
tion, we design a general network conversion algorithm framework which can be
used with various k-anonymity schemes (e.g., k-degree anonymity, k-neighborhood
anonymity) to protect privacy, and it minimizes utility loss based on the new utility
benchmark. We conduct extensive experiments on real-world networks. The results
demonstrate that our network conversion algorithm with the new utility benchmark
can significantly improve the utility of converted networks compared with the ex-
isting algorithms using the simple utility benchmark.
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5.1 Motivation
As discussed in Chapter 2.2, structural re-identification is one of the primary privacy
concerns on social network data. To resist structural re-identification attacks, vari-
ous k-anonymity-based network conversion algorithms have been proposed. These
algorithms convert a social network by inserting some fake edges and/or deleting
some existing edges to make sure for each vertex in the social network, there are at
least k  1 other vertices that are structurally indistinguishable from it based on cer-
tain attacker's background knowledge. Thereafter, the probability that an attacker
successfully re-identifies a vertex based only on her background knowledge about
the structure properties of the vertex will not exceed 1/k.
Logically, a larger k provides stronger privacy protection, but it does come with
a price. In an extreme case, a social network G is converted to a fully connected
network G, in which every vertex is connected to all the other vertices, and all
the vertices become structurally isomorphic. G achieves the highest possible level
of anonymity against any structural background knowledge. However, G actually
loses all the structural properties of G and hence is useless for data mining and
analysis. The cost of network conversion is quantified by utility loss. Ideally, we
prefer a converted social network which attains a desirable level of anonymity with
the smallest utility loss so that the data mining and analysis results derived from
the converted social network are very similar to those obtained from the original
network.
Prior work converts a social network by modifying (i.e., inserting and/or delet-
ing) edges to achieve k-anonymity and reduces utility loss byminimizing the number
of edges modified. This utility benchmark is based on a very simple intuition that
the smaller the number of edges we modify on a network, the smaller the changes
we make to the network structural properties. In this work, we argue that sometimes
this simple intuition is not correct. A network is a complex structure, and modifying
a small number of edges can make large changes to its structural properties. For ex-
ample, removing a small number of bridge edges can change a connected network to
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Figure 5.1: Examples of 2-degree anonymity achieved by modifying edges.
Table 5.1: Properties of original and anonymized networks
Networks Num. of edges modified APL CC BTW CLN
G 0 2.07 3.75 0.50 0.50
G1 1 2.00 3.50 0.54 0.52
G2 1 1.86 3.00 0.41 0.55
G3 1 2.21 4.25 0.43 0.47
disconnected. Therefore, the utility benchmark based only on this simple intuition
may fail to safeguard important network properties.
We further demonstrate this point using another simple example. Given a so-
cial networkG in Figure 5.1a, three converted networksG1, G2, and G3 are formed
which all satisfy 2-degree anonymity as illustrated in Figure 5.1b, Figure 5.1c, and
Figure 5.1d respectively. G1 and G2 are formed by inserting an edge between ver-
tices f , h and vertices c, h respectively; G3 is formed by deleting the edge between
vertices d and e. Based on the prior simple utility benchmark, G1, G2, and G3
have equally good utility because the numbers of edges modified on them are all 1.
However, if considering some other important network structural properties, such
as average path length (APL), average betweenness (BTW), clustering coefficient
(CC), and average closeness (CLN), we find that these anonymized networks ac-
tually are very different as illustrated in Table 5.1. Among the three anonymized
networks, G1 is the most similar to the original network G in terms of APL, BTW,
CC, and CLN, whileG2 andG3 are much more different fromG. Consequently, the
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simple utility measure cannot capture the utility differences amongG1, G2, and G3,
and naturally the k-anonymization algorithms developed based on it are very likely
to generate networks (e.g., G2, G3) which do not have high utility.
Motivated by the fact that most of the existing k-anonymization algorithms use
the simple utility model and may cause significant utility loss, we want to design
a new utility measure. Instead of inferring utility merely based on the number of
edges modified, it can directly evaluate the changes on network structure caused
by modifying edges. Then, by minimizing the utility loss evaluated by this utility
benchmark, k-anonymization algorithms can generate networks with high utility.
However, this task is challenging due to the following issues.
The first issue is that the usage of converted networks is unknown. A social
network is a complex data structure and has many topological properties, such as
vertex degree, eigenvector, shortest paths, and community structure. Applications
may have distinct requirements for the network properties that should be preserved
in the converted networks. Moreover, there are many data mining tasks focusing
on discovering unknown network properties. Therefore, we want to find an effec-
tive utility measure which can help to preserve many important network structural
properties.
The second issue is that the utility measure needs to be quantitative and easy
to calculate. In order to search for an optimal converted social network G that is
the"closest" to the original network G in utility, we need to quantitatively evaluate
the difference betweenG andG in terms of utility efficiently. There are some well-
known metrics that can represent important structural features of a network and can
be used to compare G and G, but they are difficult to calculate. For example, the
average path length reflects the small-world property of social networks, but its cal-
culation is based on expensive all-pair shortest path operations. Another example is
the eigenvector, which has been proved to be strongly correlated with many network
topological features. However, it requires expensive matrix decomposition.
The third issue is that the existing anonymization algorithms designed to min-
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imize the number of edge modifications are not directly applicable to optimizing
utility loss based on other utility measures, thus new algorithms need to be devel-
oped accordingly.
Optimizing utility during the social network anonymization process is a chal-
lenging problem, and it cannot be perfectly solved in one study. In this work, we
take the initiative to explore this problem. We propose to build a utility measure
based on network community structure. In other words, we evaluate the utility loss
caused by modifying an edge based on the change it makes to network community
structure. The community structure of a network reflects locally inhomogeneous
edge distribution among the vertices, with high density of edges between vertices
within one community and low density of edges between vertices from different
communities. It is a central organizing principle of complex social networks, and
has a strong correlation with many other important social network topological fea-
tures such as betweenness, eigenvector, and clustering coefficient [84]. Thus by
maintaining the community structure, we can preserve many important topological
features of a network. In addition, the influence of edge insertion or deletion oper-
ations during the anonymization process can be easily reflected by the changes in
the edge distribution within or between communities, and thus can be quantitatively
evaluated. We try to minimize the impact of edge operations on network community
structure during the anonymization process, so that we can generate an anonymized
G which is structurally similar to G with respect to many important network prop-
erties.
To sum up, the main contributions of this work are listed as follows:
1. We identify the deficiency of the simple utility measure adopted by many ex-
isting k-anonymization algorithms for preserving network utility.
2. We propose a new utility measure based on network community structure
to better capture the impact of an anonymization process on network topol-
ogy. We consider both a flat community model and a hierarchical community
model.
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3. We design a general algorithm framework to anonymize a social network and
minimize the utility loss evaluated by our new utility measure. This frame-
work is general and can be used with many different k-anonymity schemes
(e.g., k-degree anonymity and k-neighborhood anonymity).
4. We conduct extensive experiments to evaluate the proposed approach. The
results show that our method achieves significant improvement in utility com-
pared with existing k-anonymization algorithms.
5.2 Preliminaries
Following the notions defined in Section 4.2, we also model a social network as
an undirected and unweighted graph G(V;E) with a vertex vi 2 V representing
an entity in the social network, and an edge e(vi; vj) 2 E representing the social
relationship between two entities vi and vj . We assume all the vertices are private
in the social network so that their identities are removed in the converted social
network G as specified in Definition 7.
Definition 7 (Converted Social Network) The converted versionG(V ; E) of a
social network G(V;E) is obtained by removing the identity information of all the
vertices in G and with possible edge modifications (i.e., edge insertion and/or dele-
tion) . G(V ; E) is used in place of G for data mining and analysis.
We focus on structural re-identification attacks on social networks, in which an
attacker aims to identify some target entities as vertices inG using her background
knowledge about the structural properties of the targets. We use F to denote a back-
ground knowledge function that an attacker uses to determine the structural property
of an entity and F (v) to represent the structural property of an entity v with respect
to F . For instance, F can be the number of adjacent edges of a vertex (i.e., degree),
neighborhood, subgraph, etc. We formalize this attack in Definition 8.
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Definition 8 (Structural Re-identification Attack) Given a social networkG(V;E),
its converted versionG(V ; E), the background knowledge function F , and a tar-
get entity vt 2 V , the attacker searches for all the vertices inG that can provide the
same result for F as vt, referred to as VF (vt), i.e., VF (vt) = fv 2 V jF (v) = F (vt)g.
If jVF (vt)j  jV j, vt has high probability to be re-identified.
K-anonymity, as formally defined in Definition 9, is a widely adopted notion to
prevent structural re-identification attacks on social networks [59, 99, 107, 108, 110].
By converting a social network to satisfy k-anonymity, an attacker will not be able to
re-identify a vertex with probability larger than 1/k based on her background knowl-
edge F . Note that we need to specify the type of background knowledge F that an
attacker has in order to formally define k-anonymity (e.g., k-degree anonymity [59],
k-neighborhood anonymity [107]). However, when the meaning of F is clear in
context, we use k-anonymity for brevity of presentation.
Definition 9 (K-Anonymity) Given a converted social network G(V ; E) and
the background knowledge function F , G satisfies k-anonymity with respect to F ,
iff for each v 2 V , there are at least k 1 other vertices v0 2 V  withF (v0) = F (v).
Most existing algorithms use edge modification-based approaches to anonymize
a social network. That is to anonymize a network via inserting and/or deleting edges.
In this work, we also focus on the edge modification-based approaches. It is ex-
pected that an anonymized social network is structurally different from the original
network and hence loses some utility compared with the original network. Ideally, a
social network conversion algorithm should take both privacy and utility into consid-
eration. In other words, it should generate social networks that satisfy k-anonymity
at minimum utility loss.
5.3 Utility Measure
Our goal is to design a high-utility social network anonymization scheme. There-
fore, the key issue to address first is how to properly measure the utility loss of a
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converted social network. As discussed in Section 5.1, the prior utility benchmark
simply measures the number of edges modified, and may fail to capture many im-
portant network topology changes. Hence, we want to design a more proper utility
measure that can better capture complex social network structural properties.
We propose to build the utility measure based on network community structure.
The community structure of a network reflects locally inhomogeneous edge distri-
bution among the vertices. Given fixed community organization, the influence of
an edge insertion or deletion operation can be reflected by the changes in the edge
distribution within or between communities. In addition, community structure has
a strong correlation with many other important topological features of social net-
works such as betweenness, eigenvector, and clustering coefficient [84]. Therefore,
the impact of an anonymization process on community structure can also reflects its
influence on other social network topological features. Our experimental study to
be presented in Section 5.6 will validate this point.
There are various ways to model social network communities [84]. We consider
both a flat community model and a hierarchical community model. Our utility mea-
sure is built around the idea of measuring the edge distribution change within and
among communities. Therefore, the anonymization algorithm designed to minimize
utility loss based on this utility measure preserves network community structure via
preserving the edge distribution among a fixed community partition. In the follow-
ing subsections, we will introduce our utility model in detail.
5.3.1 Flat Community-based Utility Model
First, we introduce how to build our utility measure based on a flat community
model. The flat communitymodel is defined as a non-overlapping partitioning of the
vertices in a network, so that the vertices within one community are connected with
edges of high density and the vertices across different communities are connected
with edges of low density. Given a networkG(V;E), we assume it is divided intom
disjoint communities denoted by CG = fC1; C2; : : : ; Cmg, such that 8v 2 V , there
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Figure 5.2: Example of flat community model.
Table 5.2: Edge distribution sequences and utility loss based on flat community
model
(Anonymized) Networks EShn11jEj ; n12jEj ; n22jEj i UL(G;G)
G h 3
10
; 1
10
; 6
10
i N.A.
G1 h 311 ; 111 ; 711i 0.0727
G2 h 311 ; 211 ; 611i 0.1636
G3 h39 ; 19 ; 59i 0.0888
is one community Ci containing v. For example, in Figure 5.2, the social network
G is divided into 2 communities as signified by the dashed circles. Community C1
contains vertices fa; b; cg, and C2 contains fd; e; f; g; hg.
Here, we explain how to quantitatively measure the utility loss of a given mod-
ified network G(V ; E) based on the flat community model compared with the
original network G(V;E). The algorithm used to generate communities will be in-
troduced later. Suppose the community structure of G(V;E) is available. We can
quantitatively capture the edge distribution within and among the communities via
an edge distribution sequence, denoted by ES. To be more specific, we first count,
i) for each community Ci, the number of edges that connect vertices within Ci, de-
noted by nii, and ii) for each pair of communities Ci and Cj (i 6= j), the number of
edges that connect vertices from Ci to vertices from Cj , denoted by nij . Thereafter,
the percentage of edges distributed within community Ci is niijEj , and the percentage
of edges distributed across Ci and Cj is nijjEj . The edge distribution sequence ES is
then defined as hn11jEj ; n12jEj ; : : : ; nijjEj ; : : : ; nmmjEj i, (1  i  j  m). For instance, based
on the community model ofG depicted in Figure 5.2, there are 3 and 6 edges within
community C1 and community C2 respectively, and one edge across them. Since
the total number of edges in G is 10, ESG = h 310 ; 110 ; 610i. Table 5.2 lists the ESs of
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the original network G and its three anonymized counterparts.
Given a networkG and its converted versionG, we assume their corresponding
edge distribution sequences areESG andESG respectively. Compared withG, the
utility loss caused by G, denoted by UL(G;G), is measured by the L1 distance
between ESG and ESG , as defined in Equation (5.1). Using this measure, we cal-
culate the utility loss of all the three anonymized networks in Table 5.2. We observe
that anonymized networkG1 causes the smallest utility loss. This is consistent with
our observation in Section 5.1.
UL(G;G) = jjESG   ESG jj1 =
X
1im
jESG[i]  ESG [i]j (5.1)
There are various community detection algorithms proposed in the literature. In
this work, we adopt a modularity-based method, one of the most popular community
detection methods, to generate the flat community model. Modularity is a quality
function defined based on a null model to express the "strength" of communities.
By assumption, high values of modularity indicate good community partitions. In
the interests of running time, we implement the greedy modularity maximization
algorithm proposed in [73]. It is an agglomerative grouping method, where groups
of vertices (partitions) are successively joined to form larger communities. It starts
with every vertex as one partition. Then in each step, an edge is added to join two
partitions such that the maximum increase or minimum decrease of modularity w.r.t.
the previous configuration can be achieved. The algorithm terminates when one uni-
fied partition is formed. Among all the partition configurations generated in every
step of this process, the one with the largest modularity value is returned as the re-
sult. The complexity of the algorithm is O((jV j+ jEj) jV j), and it performs well
on large social networks [73]. However, we want to emphasize that our utility model
is independent of the algorithm used for generating communities and any algorithm
that generates good community partitions is applicable.
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Figure 5.3: Example of hierarchical community model.
5.3.2 Hierarchical Community-based Utility Model
Some recent work suggests that communities of social networks often exhibit hier-
archical organization (i.e., large communities in a social network may contain small
communities). A hierarchical community model capture the structure information
of a social network from coarse to fine scales, and presumably capture more detailed
structure information of the network than the flat community model. As a result, the
utility measure built upon the hierarchical community model is more sensitive to
small network structure changes caused by an anonymization process, thus provid-
ing better control of utility loss. In the following, we discuss how to measure utility
loss based on the hierarchical community model.
In this work, we use the hierarchical random graph (HRG) model proposed
in [20, 21] to capture the hierarchical organization of social network communities.
An HRG of a networkG(V;E) is a binary tree denoted byHG. Its leaf nodes corre-
spond to the vertices in V , and each non-leaf node r roots a sub-tree denoted by Tr.
The vertices in a sub-tree Tr are regarded as a community Cr. Thus, HG organizes
the communities hierarchically.
Each non-leaf node r ofHG is associated with a connection probability pr. Here,
pr is the probability that a vertex in the left subtree TLr is linked by an edge with a
vertex in the right subtree TRr . The larger the pr, the stronger the connection be-
tween r's two subtrees. Mathematically, the connection probability pr is defined in
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Table 5.3: Edge distribution sequences and utility loss based on HRG model
(Anonymized) Networks EShr1; r2; r3; r4; r5; r6; r7i UL(G;G)
G h 1
10
; 1
10
; 1
10
; 2
10
; 2
10
; 2
10
; 1
10
i N.A.
G1 h 111 ; 111 ; 111 ; 211 ; 311 ; 211 ; 111i 0.1454
G2 h 111 ; 111 ; 111 ; 211 ; 211 ; 211 ; 211i 0.1636
G3 h19 ; 19 ; 19 ; 29 ; 19 ; 29 ; 19i 0.1777
Equation (5.2).
pr =
jErj
jTLr j  jTRr j
(5.2)
where jErj is the number of edges e(vi; vj) 2 E with vi 2 TLr and vj 2 TRr ,
and jTLr j and jTRr j represent the numbers of vertices in r's left and right subtrees
respectively. An HRG of the network shown in Figure 5.1a is depicted in Figure 5.3.
The connection probability pr4 of node r4 is 1 as all the nodes in the left subtree
(i.e., node a and node b) connect to all the nodes in the right subtree (i.e., node
c). On the other hand, the connection probability pr6 of node r6 is 13 as jEr6 j =
jfe(g; d); e(g; f)gj = 2, jTLr6 j = jfe; d; fgj = 3, and jTRr6 j = jfg; hgj = 2.
Given the HRGmodel of a network, we observe that the edges of the network are
distributed among all the non-leaf nodes ri, i.e., [riEri = E. We then generate the
edge distribution sequence ES based on the edge distribution among these non-leaf
nodes. Thus,ES = h jEr1 jjEj ;
jEr2 j
jEj , : : : ;
jErm j
jEj i, wherem is the total number of non-leaf
nodes on HG. Again, we define utility loss based on the L1 distance between the
ESs of the original and anonymized networks. Table 5.3 lists the ESs of the origi-
nal networkG and its three anonymized versions based on the HRG model together
with their corresponding utility loss. Consistent with our expectation, we find that
G1 causes the smallest utility loss. This simple example serves only to demonstrate
that the utility measures based on the flat community model and the HRG model
both can help to identify good anonymization options. We will conduct comprehen-
sive experiments on real-world social networks to evaluate the performance of the
community models in Section 5.6.
Given a social network G, the optimal HRG that fits it can be determined us-
ing the Markov Chain Monte Carlo method (MCMC) proposed in [20]. It first de-
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fines a likelihood function L to evaluate the fitness of a given HRG HG to G, with
L(HG) =
Q
r2HG [p
pr
r (1  pr)1 pr ]jT
L
r jjTRr j. The higher the likelihood score, the bet-
ter HG captures the topological structure of G. Then, the MCMC method samples
the space of all possible HRGs with probability proportional to L and returns the
one having the maximum L value. The MCMC method creates a Markov chain by
defining several transitions from an HRG HG to a new H0G. It calculates the log-
arithm of L of each HRG during sampling, and accepts a transition HG ! H0G if
 logL = logL(H0G)  logL(HG)  0. Otherwise, the transition is accepted with
probability exp(logL(H0G)   logL(HG)). In the worst case, the time complexity
of the MCMC method is exponential. However, it is stated in [20] that in practice
MCMC converges to a plateau roughly after O(jV j2) steps.
5.4 High-Utility Anonymization
After introducing the community structure based utility measures, we are ready
to present our high-utility k-anonymization algorithm that converts a given social
network via edge operations and minimizes utility loss. In the following, we first
present the basic idea of the algorithm and then detail its three main components,
i.e., estimating local structure information, generating candidate edge operations,
and refining target local structure.
5.4.1 Basic Idea and Algorithm Framework
Following prior work, we only consider achieving k-anonymity via performing a
sequence of edge operations on a social network. As a result, the utility loss of the
network is affected by both the number of edge operations performed and the impact
of each edge operation. Consequently, our algorithm is designed based on a greedy
strategy which tries to approach an k-anonymized network with minimum utility
loss by finding a short edge operation sequence with each edge operation causing
small utility loss.
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Algorithm 4: High-utility k-anonymization algorithm
Input: G(V;E), F , and k
Output: K-anonymized network G
MG = constructCommunityModel(G);1
G(V ; E) = G(V;E);2
LSM = estimate(G;F; k);3
while G is not k-anonymized do4
Sop = findCandidateOp(G; LSM;MG);5
while Sop 6= ; do6
operation op = Sop:min op();7
execute(op;G);8
Sop = findCandidateOp(G; LSM;MG);9
if G is not k-anonymized then10
LSM=refine(G,LSM,G);11
return G;12
The basic idea of our algorithm is as follows. Given a network G, an attack
model F , and a privacy requirement k, we carefully perform one edge operation
at a time on G to approach k-anonymity against attacks under F . On one hand,
to keep the number of edge operations as small as possible, we choose the edge
operation that directs the current G towards its "nearest'' k-anonymized network,
which refers to the network that satisfies k-anonymity with the minimum number
of edge operations denoted by GM to facilitate our explanation. On the other hand,
among all the possible edge operations that can direct G towards GM, at each step
we perform the one which causes the smallest utility loss based on our utility loss
measure introduced in Section 5.3.
In this process, the knowledge of GM is essential, which, however, is unknown
and hard to locate. Given the fact that forming GM directly is not always possible,
we try to estimateGM by deriving the local structure information of its vertices (e.g.,
the vertex degree, and/or the neighbors' degrees of each vertex) which, based on the
givenG, F , and k, is possible. Then, according to the local structure information of
GM, a set of candidate edge operations leading G towards GM can be derived, and
we always perform the one that causes the smallest utility loss.
Algorithm 4 sketches a high-level outline of our high-utility k-anonymization
algorithm. It takes a networkG, an attack model F , and a privacy parameter k as in-
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puts, and outputs a converted networkG that is k-anonymized and has small utility
loss. Initially, the algorithm constructs and maintains a flat/hierarchical commu-
nity model of G as MG (line 1). Then, it initializes G to G, and derives the local
structure information LSM of GM based on G, F , and k (lines 2-3). Thereafter, it
generates a set of candidate edge operations (i.e., edge insertion operations and/or
edge deletion operations) based on the current G and the estimated target LSM.
The candidate operations are maintained by a set Sop together with the utility loss
score of every edge operation that is calculated based on the community modelMG
(line 5). At each step, our algorithm performs the edge operation which causes the
smallest utility loss on G, and re-generates the candidate operation set based on
the updated G (lines 7-9). This process continues until Sop becomes empty (lines
6-9). After performing all the identified candidate edge operations, there are two
possible outcomes depending on whether the current G is k-anonymized. If G is
k-anonymized, the algorithm terminates and returns G as the result (line 12). Oth-
erwise,G does not satisfy the privacy requirement, i.e., the k-anonymized network
with the local structure information LSM has not been achieved. In this case, we
need to refine the target LSM via small adjustments, and continue the previous pro-
cess (line 11). We would like to point out that in refining the target LSM, we only
consider additive adjustments, which nudge LSM towards the local structure of a
complete network. Thus, in the worst case,G will be the complete network, which
always satisfies the privacy requirement (if jV j  k ) 1. Therefore, our algorithm is
convergent.
In the following, we detail the three key components of Algorithm 4, i.e., estimat-
ing local structure information, generating candidate edge operations, and refining
local structure information.
1We want to highlight that the additive adjustments only apply to the refining local structure
information step of Algorithm 1 (i.e., lines 10-11). In the other parts of the algorithm (e.g., lines 5-9
where edge operations are performed to change the current network towards the target network), we
consider both edge addition and deletion operations.
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5.4.2 Estimating Local Structure Information
Deriving the local structure information ofGM (i.e., the k-anonymized network with
the minimum number of edge operations) is essential as it sets the target for the
anonymization algorithm. In this section, we explain how this task is performed.
As stated earlier, we only focus on k-degree anonymity for simplicity. Since the
privacy requirement sets constraints on the vertex degree of the target anonymized
network, we estimate the degree sequence DSM as the local structure information
of GM. The degree sequence DS of a network G(V;E) is a vector of size jV j with
each element DS[i] 2 DS representing the degree of a vertex in G. We further as-
sume that the degree sequence is sorted in non-ascending order of its elements (i.e.,
DS[1]  DS[2]  : : :  DS[jV j]). There are some observations that can guide the
estimation. First,DSM has the same size asDS, because we only consider network
modification via edge operations but not vertex operations. Second, DSM must be
k-anonymized since DSM is the degree sequence of a k-degree anonymized net-
work GM. In other words, for each element DSM[i] 2 DSM, there are at least k   1
other elements with the same value as DSM[i]. Third, because DSM is the degree
sequence of the "nearest'' k-anonymized networkGM, the L1 distance betweenDSM
andDS should be minimized. Based on the above observations, we employ the dy-
namic programming method proposed in [59] to find the optimalDSM withO(jV j2)
time complexity. A greedy algorithm is also available in [59] with time complexity
O(kjV j). We ignore the detail because it is not the focus of our work.
5.4.3 Generating Candidate Edge Operation Set
Once the target local structure information DSM is ready, we need to find candi-
date edge operations that convert the current G to a k-anonymized network with
its degree sequence matching DSM. Before introducing the detailed algorithm, we
define three basic types of edge operations, i.e., edge insertion, edge deletion, and
edge shift denoted by ins(vi; vj), del(vi; vj), and shift((vi; vj); (vi; vk)). As sug-
gested by their names, ins(vi; vj) inserts a new edge that links vertex vi to vertex
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vj , and del(vi; vj) removes the edge between vi and vj . shift((vi; vj); (vi; vk)) re-
places edge e(vi; vj) with edge e(vi; vk). Note that e(vi; vj) and e(vi; vk) in the edge
shift operation are carefully selected so that it does not change the edge distribution
of the constructed community model, thus the operation causes zero changes to the
utility loss score. For example, as shown in Figure 5.2, G is partitioned into two
communities. Edge e(c; d) is the crossing edge between these two communities. An
edge shift operation shift((c; d); (c; h)) shifts the end point d of this edge to vertex
h. Since d and h are in the same community, there is still one edge spanning these
two communities, thus it does not change the edge distribution on the flat commu-
nity model. Edge shift operations based on the flat community model is formally
expressed in Definition 10. Similarly, edge shift operations can be defined on the
hierarchical community model as described in Definition 11. Due to the unique fea-
ture of edge shift operations, they should receive high priority when modifying the
network to achieve k-anonymity.
Definition 10 (Edge Shift on Flat Community Model) Given a networkG(V;E),
the corresponding flat community model CG, an edge e(vi; vj) 2 E, and a vertex
vk 2 V such that e(vi; vk) 62 E, if vj and vk are in the same community, an edge
shift operation shift((vi; vj); (vi; vk)) replaces e(vi; vj) with e(vi; vk).
Definition 11 (Edge Shift on HRG) Given a network G(V;E), the corresponding
HRGHG, an edge e(vi; vj) 2 E, and a vertex vk 2 V such that e(vi; vk) 62 E, let r
be the lowest common ancestor of vj and vk on HG. If vi is not in the subtree of r,
an edge shift operation shift((vi; vj), (vi; vk)) replaces e(vi; vj) with e(vi; vk).
The goal of the edge operations is to modify the network such that its new de-
gree sequenceDS matches the target degree sequenceDSM. Therefore, the degree
difference sequence  = (DSM   DS) can give some guidance. Each element
[i] 2  with [i] > 0 (i.e., DS[i] < DSM[i]) indicates that a vertex in G(V ; E)
with degreeDS[i] needs to increase its degree, i.e., it should connect to more edges.
We maintain DS[i]s with [i] > 0 via a set DS+ and all the vertices v 2 V  that
98
DS : {4 3 3 3 2 2 2 1}
DS∗ : {4 4 3 3 2 2 2 2}
δ : {0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1}
Candidate operations: ins(f, h), ins(c, h)
V S+ = {{c, f, g}EX , h}
V S− = ∅
Figure 5.4: Generation of candidate operations.
have degree DS[i] via a set V S+. V S+ contains all the vertices that may require
edge insertion operations. Similarly, each element [j] 2  with [j] < 0 (i.e.,
DS[j] < DSM[j]) indicates that a vertex in G with degree DS[j] needs to de-
crease its degree, i.e., it should connect to fewer edges. We maintain D[j]s with
[j] < 0 via a setDS  and all the vertices v 2 V  that have degreeDS[j] via a set
V S . V S  contains all the vertices that may require edge deletion operations. Note
that a degree value of DS[i] or DS[j] may correspond to multiple vertices in G,
and we treat them equally. In addition, if the degree valueDS[i] (DS[j]) only ap-
pears once in DS+ (DS ), we cannot perform edge insertion (deletion) to connect
(disconnect) two vertices vl, vk both with the degree ofDS[i] (DS[j]). Hence we
mark these vertices as being mutually exclusive, denoted by EX(vl; vk) = True.
The mutual exclusive set is formally described in Definition 12.
Definition 12 (Mutual Exclusive Set) Given a difference sequence  = (DSM  
DS) of the target degree sequenceDSM and the degree sequenceDS of a current
network G(V ; E), we define the degree set DS+ = fDS[i] 2 DSj[i] > 0g
and the vertex set V S+ = fvj 2 V j9DS[i] 2 DS+; d(vj) = DS[i]g with d(vj)
referring to the degree of vertex vj . Let Gd = fvjjvj 2 V S+ ^ d(vj) = dg and
Dd = fDS[i]jDS[i] 2 DS+ ^DS[i] = dg. If jDdj = 1, Gd = fv1; v2; : : : ; vtg
is a mutual exclusive set denoted by fv1; v2; : : : ; vtgEX and each pair of vertices
vl; vk 2 Gd are mutually exclusive, denoted by EX(vl; vk) = True. The mutual
exclusive set on DS  can be defined analogously.
Back to the network G depicted in Figure 5.1a. Its degree sequence DS and
the target 2-degree anonymized degree sequenceDSM are shown in Figure 5.4. We
derive  = (DSM   DS) = (0; 1; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 1), and find [2] = [8] = 1 > 0.
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Hence, DS[2] (= 3) and DS[8] (= 1) are inserted into DS+. Then, all the vertices
in G with degree 3 or 1 are inserted into V S+, i.e.,V S+ = fc, f , g, hg. Note that
fc, f , gg is a mutual exclusive set. As there are no elements of  with values smaller
than 0, DS  = V S  = ;.
The reason that we form the V S+ and V S  sets is to facilitate generating can-
didate edge operations. As V S+ contains the vertices that need larger degrees,
ins(vi; vj) is a candidate operation if vi; vj(i 6= j) 2 V S+ ^ e(vi; vj) 62 E ^
EX(vi; vj) 6= True. We enumerate all candidate edge insertion operations based on
V S+ and put them in a set Opins. Similarly, del(vi; vj) is a candidate edge deletion
operation if e(vi; vj) 2 E ^ vi; vj(i 6= j) 2 V S  ^ EX(vi; vj) 6= True. Again,
we explore all candidate edge deletion operations and save them in a set Opdel. We
also consider candidate edge shift operations. For a pair of vertices (vj , vk) (j 6= k)
with vj 2 V S  and vk 2 V S+, if there is a vertex vi(i 6= j; k) such that vi, vj , and
vk satisfy the condition in Definition 10 (or Definition 11 if the HRG model but not
the flat community model is used), shift((vi; vj); (vi; vk)) is a candidate. All possi-
ble edge shift operations form another set Opshift. We continue the above example
shown in Figure 5.4. As V S  = ;, we only need to consider possible edge insertion
operations, i.e., Opdel = Opshift = ;. Based on V S+ = fc; f; g; hg and the mutual
exclusive set, we have Opins = fins(c; h); ins(f; h)g.
Given all the candidate edge operations maintained in the operation sets Opins,
Opdel, and Opshift respectively, we insert them into a candidate operation set Sop
which is used by the high-utility k-anonymization algorithm (i.e., Algorithm 4).
Before inserting the edge operations into Sop, we need to calculate the utility loss
caused by each of them, so that edge operations causing smaller utility loss will
be performed earlier. Continue our example depicted in Figure 5.4 with the utility
loss scores calculated based on the flat community model in Figure 5.3. The corre-
sponding candidate edge operation set Sop is set to fhins(f; h); 0:0727i; hins(c; h),
0:1636ig. Algorithm 5 presents the pseudo code for finding candidate operations.
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Algorithm 5: findCandidateOp algorithm
Input: G(V ; E), DSM, a community-based network modelMG
Output: Candidate operation set Sop
DS = degree sequence of G;1
 = (DSM  DS);2
DS+ = fDS[i] j [i] > 0; 1  i  jDSjg;3
DS  = fDS[j] j [j] < 0; 1  j  jDSjg;4
V S+ = V S  = ;;5
foreach d 2 DS+ do6
V S+ = V S+ [ fvijvi 2 V ; d(vi) = dg;7
foreach d 2 DS  do8
V S  = V S  [ fvj jvj 2 V ; d(vj) = dg;9
Opins = getOp(V S+; V S+);10
Opdel = getOp(V S ; V S );11
Opshift = getOp(V S+; V S ;MG);12
calculate the cost of each operation in Opins, Opdel, and Opshift;13
Sop:insert(Op
ins; Opdel; Opshift);14
return Sop;15
5.4.4 Refining Target Local Structure Information
As mentioned above, our high-utility k-anonymization algorithm generates DSM
that estimates the local structure information of the "nearest'' k-anonymized network
as the target, and performs edge operations to change the current network towards
DSM. However, it is possible that the k-anonymized network with the degree se-
quence DSM is not achievable by the current executed operation sequence. If this
happens, we fine-tuneDSM and start another attempt. We prefer that the new target
degree sequence is close to the old one, and we only consider additive adjustments
onDSM to ensure the convergence of our algorithm. Hopefully, the new targetDSM
will be achievable through our anonymization process.
In order to decide how to adjustDSM, we first consider V S+ which contains the
vertices that have not been k-anonymized and need to increase their degrees. For
any vertex vi in V S+, we cannot find a vertex vj to form a valid ins(vi; vj) operation
to increase its degree according to the current DSM. Therefore, we want to find an
element onDSM to increase its value so that later we could find a candidate operation
that increases vi's degree. For each vi 2 V S+, we find some vertices vj 2 V (i 6= j)
such that e(vi; vj) 62 E and EX(vi; vj) 6= True. These vjs form the candidates
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of which we could increase the target degree on DSM. We could randomly choose
one among the candidate vjs to increase its target degree by a small value (e.g., 1)
on DSM, but it may break the k-anonymity of DSM. Therefore, instead of directly
increasing the target degree of vj onDSM, we increase the degree of vj onDS, and
then we re-generate DSM based on the updated DS. As the change made to DS is
very small, the new DSM should be very similar to the old one.
We only consider V S+ above because we want to make additive changes to
DSM. However, when V S+ is empty, we have to utilize V S  that contains the ver-
tices which have not been k-anonymized and need to decrease their degrees. Similar
to the above, for each vertex vi 2 V S , we could find a vertex vj to reduce its target
degree to make a valid candidate operation del(vi; vj). However, this is against our
goal of only making additive changes. Alternatively, for each vertex vi 2 V S , we
increase the degree of another vertex vj onDS whose degree value is closest to that
of vi in G, then re-generate DSM based on the updated DS. The rationale is that
because vj and its corresponding vi 2 V S  have similar degree, they are very likely
to be anonymized to the same degree in the anonymized network. After the degree
of vj has been increased, vi may not need to decrease its degree anymore.
5.4.5 Computational Complexity
In this subsection, we briefly discuss the time complexity of our algorithm by ana-
lyzing the time complexity of each step in the k-anonymization process.
Based on Section 5.4.2, estimating local structure information can be processed
in O(kjV j) time. Then, the following step is to generate candidate operations.
In this step, firstly, a one-time scan on the difference sequence  is performed to
generate the vertex sets V S+ and V S , which takes time O(jV j). Given t =
maxfjV S+j; jV S jg, it takes O(t2) time to generate all candidate operations, and
the total number of candidate operations generated is at most O(t2). For each can-
didate operation, we need to calculate the utility loss that it may cause based on
the given community model, which is the L1 distance between the edge distribu-
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tion sequences as described in Section 5.3. Usually, the time complexity of cal-
culating L1 distance is linear to the length of the edge distribution sequence repre-
sented by l. However, we observe that each edge operation only affects the number
of edges corresponding to at most one element of the edge distribution sequence,
as well as the total number of edges. For example, if we add one edge e(c; h)
in the example network in Figure 5.1a, it will only affect n12 (i.e., the number of
edges distributed between communities C1 and C2) of the flat community model
in Figure 5.2, and increase the total number of edges by 1. Suppose ES and ES
are the edge distribution sequence of the original network and that of the modi-
fied network via adding e(c; h), the L1 distance between them is calculated as fol-
lows: jjES   ESjj1 =
P
ij(
nij
jEj   nijjEj+1) (n12jEj   n12jEj+1)+(jn12jEj   n

12
jEj+1 j)= ( 1jEj  
1
jEj+1)
P
ij nij (n12jEj   n12jEj+1)+(jn12jEj   n

12
jEj+1 j). With
P
ij nij being calculated only
once within O(l) time, the utility loss of every candidate operation can be easily
calculated in constant time. This observation also applies to the HRG model. Con-
sequently, calculating the utility loss scores of all candidate operations can be pro-
ceed in O(l + t2) time, including spotting the operation with the lowest utility loss.
To sum up, the overall computation time of the second step is O(jV j) + O(l + t2).
In the worst case, when all vertices need to increase or decrease their degrees, t =
maxfjV S+j; jV S jg = jV j. For the flat community model, l = m2 with m being
the number of communities in the model. For the HRG model, l = jV j   1. There-
fore, the upper bound of the value of l is jV j2. Consequently, the worst-case time
complexity of generating candidate operations is O(jV j2). However, in real cases,
the degree sequence of a social network usually follows a power-law distribution,
resulting in low frequencies of vertices sharing large degree values and high frequen-
cies of vertices having small degree values. In other words, in a social network, it
is very likely that a large amount of low-degree vertices already satisfy k-degree
anonymity and hence do not need to change their degree, i.e., t << jV j. Then, the
number of communitiesm is also far smaller than jV j. Therefore, the running time
of the candidate operation generation process most likely will be much smaller than
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that in the worst case.
The running time of the refinement process depends on the size of the remaining
V S+ or V S  sets. Suppose the size is t, the time complexity of this process is
O(tjV j). Generally, t << jV j, thus tjV j << jV j2.
Based on the above analysis, the worst-case computational complexity of one it-
eration of the k-anonymization process is O(jV j2), but the real running time of this
process in most cases is much shorter. As it is hard to anticipate the number of iter-
ations that the algorithm will run before convergence, we will conduct experiments
to further test the time performance of our algorithm in Section 5.6.
5.5 Discussion
In this section, we further enrich this work by discussing the security of the k-
anonymity scheme against minimality attacks and discuss the extendability of our k-
anonymization algorithm to other k-anonymity schemes e.g., k-neighborhood anonymity.
5.5.1 Privacy Analysis
Minimality attacks first discussed in [98] primarily focus on k-anonymity schemes
on tabular data. As stated in [98], in order to preserve the utility of published data,
k-anonymity mechanisms all have the same underlying principle of minimizing the
distortion to the original data. In other words, k-anonymity algorithms only distort
the input data when necessary. Sometimes, this information can be used by adver-
saries to launch minimality attacks on published data to infer sensitive information
of individuals and jeopardize privacy. In the following, we discuss the minimality
notions defined in our k-degree anonymity algorithm, and show that these notions
will not lead to minimality attacks.
The first minimality notion used in our algorithm is minimizing the distortion on
the degree sequence of the input network (i.e. minimizing the number of edges mod-
ified). We use this notion to generate an objective degree sequence (i.e. the degree
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User Identity Degree 
Alice 4 
Bob 3 
Tom 3 
Michael 3 
Grace 2 
Andrew 2 
Jamie 2 
Anne 1 
 
ͳ × ͳ ʹൗ = ͳ ʹൗͳ ͵ൗ × ͳ ʹൗ = ͳ 6ൗʹ ͵ൗ × ͳ ʹൗ = ͳ ͵ൗͳ × ͳ Ͷൗ = ͳ Ͷൗͳ × ͳ Ͷൗ = ͳ Ͷൗ
(a) Attacker's worst-case back-
ground knowledge
 
Vertex ID Degree 
c 4 
d 4 
g 3 
f 3 
a 2 
b 2 
e 2 
h 2 
 ͳ × ͳ ʹൗ = ͳ ʹൗͳ ͵ൗ × ͳ ʹൗ = ͳ 6ൗʹ ͵ൗ × ͳ ʹൗ = ͳ ͵ൗͳ × ͳ Ͷൗ = ͳ Ͷൗͳ × ͳ Ͷൗ = ͳ Ͷൗ
(b) Vertex degree of the 2-degree
anonymized network
 
User Identity Mapped Vertex ID Probability 
Alice c, d     ͳ × ͳ ʹൗ = ͳ ʹൗ  
Bob 
Tom 
Michael 
c, d     ͳ ͵ൗ × ͳ ʹൗ = ͳ 6ൗ  
g, f     ʹ ͵ൗ × ͳ ʹൗ = ͳ ͵ൗ  
Grace 
Andrew 
Jamie 
a, b, e, h     ͳ × ͳ Ͷൗ = ͳ Ͷൗ  
Anne a, b, e, h        ͳ × ͳ Ͷൗ = ͳ Ͷൗ  
 (c) Attacker's inference probability
Figure 5.5: Minimality attack: attacker's worst-case background knowledge, vertex
degree of published network, and inference probability.
sequence of the published network). We assume that in the worst case, an adversary
has background knowledge of both the identity and degree of every individual ver-
tex of a social network. Figure 5.5a shows the adversary's worst-case background
knowledge of the social network depicted in Figure 5.1a, and Figure 5.5b lists the
degree of every vertex in the published 2-degree anonymized network in Figure 5.1c.
The adversary's goal is to map the real identities of the individuals to the vertices
in the published network. With the minimality notion, the adversary reasons there
must be only one vertex of degree 3 and one vertex of degree 1 having their de-
grees increased, and the degrees of other vertices remain. Therefore, the adversary
infers that Alice with degree 4 must be mapped to a vertex also with degree 4 in the
published network. Since there are two vertices c and d with degree 4, without any
extra information, the probabilities of Alice being mapped to c and d are equal (i.e.
1
2
). However, Bob with degree 3 can be mapped to a vertex either with degree 4 or
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degree 3. Because there are totally three individuals with degree 3 in the original
social network, the probability of Bob being the one that has degree increased is 1
3
,
and the probability that his degree is unchanged is 2
3
. Therefore, the probability of
Bob being mapped to vertex c or d is 1
3
 1
2
= 1
6
, and the probability of him being
mapped to vertex g or f is 2
3
 1
2
= 1
3
. Similarly, the mapping probability of every
individual is calculated as shown in Figure 5.5c. Lemma 3 proves that the mapping
probability that an adversary can calculate based on this minimality notion will not
exceed 1
k
.
Lemma 3 Given a published k-degree anonymized social network which is con-
structed by the minimality notion of minimizing the distortion on the degree se-
quence, we assume that in the worst case, an attacker knows the real identity and
degree of every individual in the social network, and she is also aware of the mini-
mality notion. The attacker cannot map an individual to any vertex with probability
larger than 1
k
.
Proof 3 We denote the inferred mapping probability of an individual x to a vertex v
with degree d in the published network as pxv . pxv = p1p2 where p1 is the probability
that x is mapped to a vertex with degree d, and p2 is the probability that among all
the vertices with degree d, x is mapped to v. In the worst case, with the minimality
notion, the attacker can infer p1 with the maximum probability of 1. According to the
k-anonymity condition, there are at least k vertices in the published network having
degree d. Without any extra information, the attacker can only infer the mapping
from x to these vertices with equal probability. Therefore, the maximum value of p2
is 1
k
. Therefore, pxv  1 1k = 1k .
The second minimality notion used in our algorithm is modifying a network to
achieve k-anonymity by adding and deleting edges which make the smallest utility
changes evaluated by the community-based utility model. For an attacker to use this
notion to infer the details of the edge modification (i.e., anonymization) process then
possibly to further infer user identities, she has to know the utility loss caused by
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every possible edge operation. However, in order to calculate utility loss, she has
to know the community model based on which the utility measure is defined. With-
out the exact community model, the attacker cannot utilize this minimality notion to
make inferences. Therefore, in order to prevent attackers from utilizing the second
minimality notion, when publishing an anonymized network, the community model
constructed should be kept secret. Moreover, revealing the community model will
also provide attackers extra information about the original network besides vertex
degree, which is against the worst-case assumption of our privacy scheme that at-
tackers only know the degree information of vertices. This further explains that the
community model should not be disclosed. However, we do not mind if attackers
know the algorithm used to construct the community model. This is because at-
tackers, based on the construction algorithm and vertex degree information, cannot
reconstruct the community model.
We need to point out that the analysis above is based on the assumption that
attackers only have background knowledge of vertex degree. If attackers have some
extra information about the edges among certain individuals, they may be able to
infer the identities of some vertices with higher probability. For instance, in the
example above, besides the vertex degree information, the attacker knows thatAlice
is connected with Grace and Andrew in the social network, she can further infer
that vertex c is Alice. Because c connects with more than two vertices which can
potentially beGrace and Andrew (i.e., a, b, and h) but the other candidate of Alice
(i.e., vertex d) does not. Therefore, privacy is compromised. We reserve this topic
as an interesting problem to be studied in the future.
5.5.2 Extendability to OtherK-Anonymity Schemes
As mentioned before, the proposed high-utility k-anonymization framework is gen-
eral, and it is applicable to other k-anonymity schemes. In the following, we briefly
explain how to extend the framework (as defined in Algorithm 4) to support k-
neighborhood anonymity. Due to the focus of this work, we only present how to
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estimate local structure information and how to generate candidate edge operations
in the context of k-neighborhood anonymity.
A k-neighborhood anonymized networkG(V ; E) requires that for every ver-
tex v 2 V , there are at least k  1 other vertices having isomorphic neighborhoods
as v. The neighborhoodNB(v) of v is a subgraph containing all the vertices within
certain distance d to v and the edges among these vertices. d decides the size of the
neighborhood. To simplify the discussion, we only consider neighborhoods within
a distance of 1 (i.e., d=1), which is a common practice in other work [107]. Unless
otherwise noted, the term "neighborhood" only refers to a neighborhood with d = 1.
The local structure information used by k-neighborhood anonymization is the
neighborhood subgraph of every vertex. Like using the degree sequence to capture
the local degree information of a network in k-degree anonymization, we use the
neighborhood set NS to record the local neighborhood NB(vi) of every vertex vi
of a network, and we try to generate the neighborhood set NSM of the "nearest''
anonymized network. Again, for a given network G, its "nearest'' anonymized net-
workGM refers to an anonymized network that satisfies k-neighborhood anonymity
and is generated via the smallest number of edge operations. As generating GM is
not always possible, we use the neighborhood set NSM of GM as the estimation of
the local structure information of GM.
Given G and the privacy parameter k, NSM has the following properties. First,
NSM has the same cardinality asNS. Second,NSM is k-anonymized, meaning that
for eachNBM(vi) 2 NSM, it has at least k  1 other isomorphic subgraphs inNSM.
Third, the sum of the graph edit distance from every NBM(vi) to its corresponding
NB(vi) is minimized (i.e., the number of edge operations needed to change G to
GM is minimized). Again, take the network shown in Figure 5.1a as an example.
Assume k = 2, the neighborhoodNS(vi) and its corresponding target neighborhood
NSM(vi) of every vertex vi are depicted in Fig. 5.6. We group the vertices having
isomorphic neighborhoods in the target anonymized network into one equivalent
group EG, i.e., 8vi; vj 2 EG,NSM(vi) = NSM(vj). As shown in the figure, fa; bg
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Figure 5.6: Example of the vertices' neighborhoods and estimated target neighbor-
hoods.
is an equivalent group, so as fc; gg, fe; hg, and fd; fg.
After obtaining NSM, we need to find candidate operations that can direct the
current network to a k-neighborhood anonymized network having the target vertex
neighborhoods NSM. In order to do this, we first identify the vertices whose neigh-
borhoods are not the same as their target neighborhoods and store them in a set V S.
And then, for each of these vertices vi 2 V S, all the viable edge operations that can
nudgeNB(vi) towardsNBM(vi) are added into a candidate operation set. Continue
the previous example. We find that, to change their current neighborhoods to the
target neighborhoods, both vertex e and vertex d need to delete one edge (vertex)
from their neighborhoods respectively. Consequently, the edge deletion operation
del(e; d) qualifies as a candidate operation. Given the set of all candidate operations,
we calculate the utility loss caused by each of them and perform the operation with
the smallest utility loss. Then, we update V S and regenerate the candidate operation
set.
Obviously, a candidate edge operation serves at least one vertex vi to convert
the neighborhood of vi to its target neighborhood NSM(vi). For example, operation
del(e; d) serves vertex e and vertex d. However, we want to highlight that an edge
operation may affect the neighborhoods of some vertices which it does not meant to
affect, hence the target neighborhoods of these vertices may no long be applicable
after the edge operation is performed. For instance, del(e; d) will also affect the
neighborhood of f . Note that this issue does not exist in k-degree anonymity as a
given edge operation only changes the degrees of the two associated vertices. In
order to make the target neighborhoods consistent in an iteration of the algorithm,
we identify all the vertices whose neighborhoods are not supposed to be affected
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Figure 5.7: Example of 2-neighborhood anonymization
but are changed, as well as the vertices in the same equivalent groups as them, and
exclude them from the updated set V S when we regenerate candidate operations.
The process repeats until no candidate operations are generated. If the obtained
graphG is k-anonymized, the algorithm stops. If not, we regenerate the targetNSM
based on the currentG. In this step, the previously excluded vertices are considered,
and their new target neighborhoods are regenerated. To ensure the convergence of
the algorithm, we are slightly biased towards choosing edge insertion operations
among all candidate operations.
Continue the above example. Since there is only one candidate operation del(e; d),
we have no other choices but execute it. All the neighborhoods affected by this op-
eration are illustrated in Figure 5.7a including the neighborhoods of vertices e, d,
and f . As this edge deletion operation is to serve vertices e and d, the vertex that it
does not meant to affect but is actually affected is f . Consequently, all the vertices
that are within the same equivalent group as f (i.e., vertex d) are excluded when
we regenerate candidate edge operations after performing del(e; d). However, we
find that after performing this operation, no candidate operations can be found. As
the network is already 2-anonymized, the algorithm completes. The generated 2-
neighborhood anonymized network is shown in Figurei 5.7b.
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5.6 Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we conduct comprehensive experiments to demonstrate the advan-
tages of the proposed high-utility k-anonymization algorithm. We focus on k-degree
anonymity and implement two anonymization algorithms based on the flat commu-
nity model and the hierarchical community model, respectively referred to as Flat
and HRG. We also implement two existing k-degree anonymization algorithms pro-
posed in [59] as competitors. Note that [59] is the only work in the literature focusing
on k-degree anonymity, and the algorithms are designed to preserve network util-
ity by minimizing the number of modified edges. The first probing method only
considers edge addition operations. It first constructs a target k-anonymized degree
sequence for the input network based on adding the smallest number of edges then
inserts edges to the network to form a k-anonymized network with the desired target
degree sequence. While the second greedy swap method considers both edge addi-
tion and deletion operations. It first derives a target k-anonymized degree sequence
of the input network based on both adding and deleting edges then constructs a new
network with the target degree sequence. In order to make the new network have a
similar edge set to the input network (i.e., minimize the number of edges modified),
it performs edge swap operations on the new network which keep the degree se-
quence intact and maximize the intersection of the edge sets of the new network and
the input network. We refer these two algorithms to as Prob: and Swap respectively.
We use utility and running time as the main performance metrics. Our utility
model is designed based on social network community structure, and it is expected
to preserve social network community structure. Therefore, we evaluate the utility
of a k-anonymized network mainly based on how well it preserves the community
structure of the original network. Community is an important social network prop-
erty, and it is useful to many applications. For example, identifying communities
of customers with similar interests can help online retailers to set up recommen-
dation systems to enhance business opportunities [81], and communities of a large
network can be used to create data structures to efficiently store the network and
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Figure 5.8: Community utility loss caused by anonymization (k = 10).
handle navigational queries [4].
We use the four real-world networks introduced in Section 4.3 in the experiments
including polblogs, facebook, grqc, and route-view. Our experiments run on a
Linux server with 2.67GHz CPU and 128G RAM.
5.6.1 Community Utility
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the algorithms on preserving commu-
nity utility. Similar to Section 4.6.3, we run Clauset and Newman's classic greedy
community detection algorithm [22] on networks and use the Rand index and nor-
malized mutual information (NMI) [30] metrics to compare the communities gener-
ated on an anonymized network with those generated on the corresponding original
network. The details of the two metrics were introduced in Section 4.6.3. That the
values of these two metrics are close to 1 indicates that the community partitions are
very similar.
Figure 5.8 presents the results on the four tested networks. In the experiments,
we set the privacy parameter k at 10. We find that the Rand index values and NMI
values of our Flat and HRG algorithms are all higher than those of the existing Prob:
and Swap algorithms. The Rand index values of our algorithms are all higher than
0.9, and the NMI values of our algorithms are all larger than 0.6 on the four tested
networks. These indicate that our algorithms can generate networks with similar
community structure to the original networks. However, in many cases the exist-
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Figure 5.9: Community utility changes with k on polblogs network.
ing algorithms cannot preserve network community structure well, for example, the
Prob: and Swap algorithms on the route-view network. Even though the Rand in-
dex values of these algorithms are high, they are more likely caused by the pairs
of vertices which are not partitioned in the same communities as the corresponding
NMI values are very low. Therefore, our algorithms have great advantages over the
existing algorithms for preserving community utility.
We also find the HRG algorithm that runs based on the hierarchical community
model (i.e., HRG) generally generates networks with better community utility than
the Flat algorithm which is based on the flat community model. The reason is that
the complex HRGmodel captures more detailed information of network community
structure, and it is more sensitive to small numbers of edgemodifications. Therefore,
the anonymization algorithmwhich evaluates utility loss based on this model is more
accurate, thus generating networks that better represent the features of the original
networks.
We also test the utility performance of the four algorithms with increasing k and
present the results in Figure 5.9. We only present the results on the polblogs network,
and the results on the other networks are omitted as they have similar trends. We
find that the utility performance of the four algorithms degrades as k increases. It
is not surprising because in order to achieve higher levels of privacy with larger k,
we need to make more distortions to networks. In the figure, we find our algorithms
outperform the two existing algorithms under all the k settings.
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Figure 5.10: Utility benchmarks (k = 10).
5.6.2 Utility Benchmark
From the above experiments we find the four algorithms generate networks with dif-
ferent community utility. The HRG algorithm generates networks of the best utility
followed by the Flat algorithm and then the Prob: algorithm. The Swap algorithm
generates networks of the worst utility. In this section, we investigate whether the
different utility benchmarks can reflect the real utility of the networks generated by
the four algorithms. There are three utility benchmarks used. The existing algo-
rithms measure utility using the number of modified edges. We propose two novel
utility benchmarks which evaluate the edge distribution changes within and between
a fixed community partition of a network caused by anonymization. One of them
is designed based on a flat community model, and the other is designed based on a
hierarchical community model.
We calculate the utility of the networks generated by the four algorithms based
on the three utility benchmarks respectively and report the results in Figure 5.10.
Figure 5.10a shows the numbers of modified edges of different algorithms on the
four tested networks. According to this utility benchmark, the networks generated
by the Prob: algorithm have the best utility as they have the smallest numbers of
modified edges, the networks generated by the Flat algorithm have higher utility
than those generated by the HRG algorithm, and the networks generated by the Swap
algorithm have the worst utility. This is not consistent with our experimental results
on real community utility. Therefore, the simple utility benchmark used by the ex-
isting algorithms cannot reflect the real community utility of anonymized networks.
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Figure 5.10b and Figure 5.10c show the edge distribution changes caused by differ-
ent algorithms based on the flat and hierarchical community models respectively.
According to these two utility benchmarks, the four algorithms sorted in descend-
ing order of their utility are HRG, Flat, Prob:, and Swap. This is consistent with
our experimental results on real community utility. Therefore, both of the two util-
ity benchmarks we proposed can reflect the real community utility of the networks
generated by different algorithms.
5.6.3 Other Utility
The experimental results above have demonstrated that our high-utility k-anonymization
algorithms can preserve network community utility very well. As community struc-
ture is closely related to many important network structural properties, we expect
our algorithms can preserve other types of network utility as well. Therefore, in this
section, we test the utility performance of the algorithms based on two other types
of network utility including centrality utility and shortest path utility.
Centrality Utility
We first evaluate the performance of the algorithms on centrality utility. Similar to
Section 4.6 in Chapter 4, we perform the evaluation based on four basic centrality
metrics including degree centrality, betweenness centrality, closeness centrality, and
PageRank centrality, and we also use the average change ratio of centrality scores
to evaluate how well the anonymization algorithms preserve raw centrality scores
of vertices and use Spearman's rank correlation coefficient (SRCC) to evaluate how
well the anonymization algorithms preserve the ranks of vertices based on centrality.
Figure 5.11-5.14 provide the experimental results. In the experiments, we set the
privacy parameter k at 10. We find from the figures that for three centrality metrics
(i.e., closeness, betweenness, PageRank) our algorithms (i.e., Flat and HRG ) out-
perform the existing algorithms (i.e., Prob: and Swap ) as our algorithms result in
much smaller average change ratios on the raw centrality scores and higher SRCC
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Figure 5.11: Degree centrality utility loss caused by anonymization (k = 10).
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Figure 5.12: Closeness centrality utility loss caused by anonymization (k = 10).
values. However, for degree centrality, the Swap algorithm causes the lowest aver-
age change ratio and the highest SRCC values. It is because the Swap algorithm is
developed based on edge swap operations which intend to keep vertex degree intact.
Therefore, this algorithm makes the smallest distortion on vertex degree. From Fig-
ure 5.11, we observe that even our algorithms do not perform edge swap operations,
they cause very small changes to vertex degree. The average change ratios on the
four tested networks are all smaller than 0:13, and the SRCC values are all larger
than 0:87.
We also observe from the figures that in most of the cases our algorithms cause
very small distortions to the raw centrality scores and the centrality ranks. The av-
erage change ratios of our algorithms are smaller than 0:3 and the SRCC values are
larger than 0:7. However, for the betweenness centrality, we find that our algorithms
cause relatively large average change ratios, which are still much smaller than those
caused by the existing algorithms. This is mainly because of some outlier vertices
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Figure 5.13: Betweenness centrality utility loss caused by anonymization (k = 10).
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Figure 5.14: PageRank centrality utility loss caused by anonymization (k = 10).
which originally have very small betweenness scores. Small increases in the be-
tweenness scores of these vertices during the anonymization process can result in
very large change ratios. Despite the large average change ratios, the SRCC values
of our algorithms are always very high, which means our algorithms can preserve
the ranks of vertices based on betweenness centrality well. Finally, we find the HRG
algorithm generates networks with better centrality utility than the Flat algorithm.
Shortest Path Utility
In this section, we evaluate the shortest path utility performance of the algorithms.
We use the change ratio of diameter which is the longest shortest path length in a
network and the average change ratio of the shortest path lengths between all pairs
of vertices as the metrics. Figure 5.15 shows the results. We find that our algo-
rithms cause smaller changes to the diameters and the shortest path lengths of the
four tested networks compared with the existing algorithms. Especially, the HRG
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Figure 5.15: Shortest path utility loss caused by anonymization (k = 10).
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Figure 5.16: Degree centrality utility changes with k on polblogs network.
algorithm causes no changes to the diameters of the four networks, and the average
change ratios of shortest path lengths of our algorithms are always smaller than 0:2.
These findings demonstrate that our algorithms can preserve shortest path length
information very well. We also observe that the HRG algorithm performs slightly
better than the Flat algorithm.
Other Utility Performance V.S.K
We also test the centrality utility and shortest path utility performance of the four
algorithms with increasing k and present the results in Figure 5.16-5.20. We only
present the results on the polblogs network, and the results of similar trends on the
other networks are omitted. Similar to the findings in Section 5.6.1, we find that
generally the utility performance of the four algorithms degrades as k increases.
In the figures, we find our algorithms outperform the two existing algorithms in
all the tested utility metrics except degree centrality, under all the k settings. The
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Figure 5.17: Closeness centrality utility changes with k on polblogs network.
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Figure 5.18: Betweenness centrality utility changes with k on polblogs network.
Swap algorithm performs the best on degree centrality, but the performance of our
algorithms is comparable.
5.6.4 Running Time
In this section, we evaluate the time performance of the algorithms and report the
results in Figure 5.21. Figure 5.21a shows the running time of the four algorithms on
the four tested networks as k is set at 10. From the figure, we find the Prob: algorithm
achieves the best time performance. The running time of the Flat algorithm is slightly
longer but comparable to that of the Prob: algorithm. Sometimes the running time of
the Swap algorithm and the HRG algorithm can be much longer than that of the other
two algorithms (e.g., on the polblogs and facebook networks). The long running
time of the Swap algorithm is because of the large number of possible edge swap
operations, and the long running time of the HRG algorithm is mainly because of the
the large number of candidate operations.
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Figure 5.19: PageRank centrality utility changes with k on polblogs network.
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Figure 5.20: Shortest path utility changes with k on polblogs network.
Figure 5.21b reports the running time changes of the four algorithms on the pol-
blogs network with increasing k. The results of similar trends on the other networks
are omitted to avoid redundancy. From the figure, we find that the running time of
the Prob:, Flat, and HRG algorithms grows fast as k increases. This is because in
order to achieve anonymity with larger k, usually more edges need to be modified.
While the running time of Swap is not sensitive to changing k, but it always remains
high. This is because the Swap method always needs to consider a large number of
possible edge swap operations even with small k. Generally, the time performance
of the Flat algorithm is good and comparable to that of the Prob: algorithm.
To sum up, the comprehensive experimental results clearly demonstrate that the
high-utility k-anonymization algorithms (i.e. Flat and HRG) which are designed
based on the community structure-based utility models can very well preserve net-
work community utility as well as many other types of network utility (i.e., cen-
trality utility and shortest path utility). The advantages of our algorithms in utility
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Figure 5.21: Time performance.
are significant compared with the existing k-anonymization algorithms which con-
trol utility simply based on the number of edge modifications. The HRG algorithm
has better utility performance than the Flat algorithm, however, incurs much more
expensive time cost. Therefore, we recommend that in the cases where time perfor-
mance is critical, people employ the Flat algorithm to achieve good utility with short
running time, while the HRG algorithm is recommended when time performance is
not the main concern to achieve the best utility.
5.7 Summary
In this chapter, we have discovered that existing k-anonymization approaches on
social networks provide good protection for user identity privacy. However, with a
naive utility model which evaluates utility loss based only on the number of edges
modified during an anonymization process, they fail to generate anonymized net-
works with high utility. To solve this problem, we have proposed a high-utility
social network anonymization framework to achieve good privacy protection with
low utility loss. In our approach, we use a novel utility measure which directly
evaluates the changes that an anonymization algorithm makes to network commu-
nity structure. Our utility measure can work with both flat community structure and
hierarchical community structure. We have performed experiments on real-world
datasets and shown that our approach outperforms existing approaches in utility.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
In this chapter, we summarize the dissertation by reviewing the social network data
preparation problem and the work we have accomplished. Then, we discuss some
promising directions for future work.
6.1 Dissertation Summary
Raw social network data have many undesirable features such as vast, noisy, dis-
tributed, and sensitive, which challenge data analysis and mining research. In order
to enhance data quality and usability and enable successful data analysis and min-
ing tasks, data preparation is indispensable. Social network data preparation is a
complex process which consists of data collection, data cleaning, data reduction,
and data conversion steps. Each of these steps deals with various distinctive chal-
lenging problems. In this dissertation, we study three important problems in social
network data preparation. The first one is the sampling problem of social network
content data in the data collection step, and the second and third ones are the privacy
protection issue and the utility issue respectively in the data conversion step.
In Chapter 3, we perform an exploratory study of user-generated Twitter data
samples obtained from the Twitter stream API, which is the data source for a va-
riety of research and commercial applications. We compare the sample data with
the corresponding complete dataset in many different aspects including basic tweet
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statistics, content representativeness, user coverage, and user interactions in order
to understand the nature of the sample data, their bias, and how well they represent
the complete data stream. We make some interesting observations. For example,
we find that the Twitter data samples with a low sampling rate of 0:96% are good
enough for studying general Twitter user activity patterns, analyzing certain tweet
contents e.g., text terms and url domains; however, for some other tweet contents
such as hashtags, larger samples are preferred in order to obtain accurate results.
We also find that the sample data are biased towards active users and miss lots of
user interaction information, but extending the sampling period and increasing the
sampling rate both help to improve the coverage of the user base and the accuracy
of the interaction-based user popularity estimation. Our findings provide insights
about the sample data obtained from the Twitter stream API and provide incentives
for people to use or not to use them for their research.
In Chapter 4, we discover a new type of privacy attacks on social networks called
connection fingerprint (CFP) attacks, in which attackers utilize the connection in-
formation of an anonymized user to some known public users in a social network to
re-identify the user and compromise identity privacy. We formally analyze the risk
of CFP attacks on real-world social networks and demonstrate these attacks can se-
riously damage user identity privacy. We propose two efficient k-anonymity-based
network conversion algorithms to protect social networks against CFP attacks and
preserve the utility of converted networks. One algorithm is based on adding dummy
vertices. It can resist powerful attackers with the connection information of a user
with the public users within n hops (n  1) and can preserve the centrality utility
of public users. The other algorithm is based on edge modifications. It is only able
to resist attackers with the connection information of a user with the public users
within 1 hop but preserve a rich spectrum of network utility.
In Chapter 5, we find that existing k-anonymity based algorithms convert net-
works to protect privacy by modifying edges, and they preserve utility by minimiz-
ing the number of edges modified. We find this simple utility model cannot reflect
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real utility changes of networks with complex structure. Thus, relying on it, exist-
ing k-anonymization algorithms cannot guarantee generating social networks with
high utility. To improve utility performance, we propose a novel utility benchmark
which directly evaluates the changes that a network conversion algorithm makes
to network community structure. In addition, we design a general network con-
version algorithm framework with the new utility benchmark which can be used
with various k-anonymity schemes, e.g., k-degree anonymity and k-neighborhood
anonymity. Experimental results on real-world networks demonstrate that the com-
munity structure-based utility benchmark can better reflect real community utility
of converted social networks compared with the existing naive utility model. Our
network conversion algorithms using the new utility benchmark significantly out-
perform existing algorithms in utility.
To summarize, in this dissertation we consider three important problems in social
network data preparation including sample representativeness, privacy protection,
and utility preserving. Our study motivates people to use sampled social network
data more carefully and provides people methods to better preserve the privacy and
utility of social network data. It benefits data mining and analysis tasks by providing
more reliable social network data.
6.2 Future Work
We conclude this dissertation by outlining several interesting and promising research
problems for further work.
In the study of sampled Twitter data, we realize that many Twitter data analysis
applications use the Twitter stream API to obtain the same sampled Twitter data
for various analysis tasks. However, the sample data are good for certain analysis
tasks such as user activity pattern characterization and sentiment analysis, but may
not be suitable for some other tasks such as user network analysis. We think it is
meaningful to study task-specific sampling techniques to generate tweet streams
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that are suitable for different analysis applications. Note that the sample datasets
obtained from the Twitter Stream API are sampled sets of tweets. Although we can
extract user ids and interaction information from tweet data, tweets do not contain
the "follower" and "friend" relationship information declared by Twitter users, which
is important metadata. It is an interesting open question whether these relationships
can be inferred from tweets and the user interaction information that is available in
sample data streams.
In the study of network conversion algorithms against CFP attacks, we find that
in some cases, our algorithms have different utility performance on different net-
works. We think it is interesting to explore the relationship between network struc-
ture and utility performance in future work. Another direction of improvement is
the utility performance of the algorithms on networks with a large number of public
users or when the privacy parameter k is large.
In the study of utility benchmarks in social network privacy protection, we pro-
pose an utility benchmark based on network community structure and demonstrate
its advantage for reflecting real network community utility. It is interesting to study
other practical utility benchmarks which can reflect other different types of network
utility.
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